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In recent years, courts have applied the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA ") to pre-empt an increasingly wide scope of state
laws, with the effect of limiting remedies of plan participants and beneficiaries
and frustrating state health care reform efforts. Professor Jordan argues that
the recent Supreme Court decision in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co. is a signal from the Court that
ERISA pre-emption should be applied more narrowly. She first analyzes the
Court's prior pre-emption decisions and identifies delimiting language unheeded
by lower courts. She then explores the impact of Travelers on ERISA pre-
emption analysis, finding the decision renews emphasis on the historical
presumption against pre-empting laws within state police power and takes a
more pragmatic approach to discerning congressional intent regarding ERISA
pre-emption. Finally, by examining certain emerging pre-emption issues,
namely those involving provider taxes and contract and tort claims she assesses
the effectiveness of the analytical framework derived from Travelers and prior
Supreme Court cases in restraining the scope of ERISA pre-emption. Professor
Jordan concludes that the framework can effectively restrain findings of pre-
emption and should lead to more rational pre-emption decisions.
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Introduction
While critics have pointed to the failings of the American health care
system for many years,' the adverse impact of the Employee Retirement
1. In keeping with our general commitment to free-market capitalism, the U.S. health care
system has evolved as an "industry" driven by economic incentives. At the same time, unique
aspects of the health care industry preclude it from functioning as a free market. See generally
PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1983). Federal and state governments
recognize the deficiencies of the free market in health care services and have tried to regulate the
industry in order to cure them. In a much publicized example, the Clinton Administration proposed
a comprehensive federal plan for health system reform in 1993. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), reprinted in 139 CONG. REc. 148, E2571-E2716 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1993). However,
strong for-profit entities have been largely successful in blocking legislative modifications to the
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Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 2 on the health care system has only
recently gained significant attention.3 Since its enactment in 1974, courts have
gradually interpreted and applied ERISA in a manner that affects numerous
aspects of the health care system. In particular, during the last decade serious
obstacles for health care consumers have arisen as a result of broader
application of ERISA's pre-emption provisions. This article explores the
viability of expansive interpretations of ERISA pre-emption in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co.'
Ascertaining the appropriate scope of ERISA pre-emption is crucial
because ERISA effects virtually all Americans who obtain health benefits
through a private employer. ERISA pre-empts all state laws that "relate to"
an employee benefit plan.5 "Employee benefit plans" are defined to include
plans established or maintained by an employer for the purpose of providing
medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits.6 Regardless of whether the
benefits are provided through a contract with an insurer, a health maintenance
organization (HMO),' or a self-funded plan,' all health benefit plans obtained
through a qualified employer9 are within the scope of ERISA.10 Yet, ERISA
system, especially at the federal level.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3. See, e.g., Daniel A. Engel, ERISA: Where's the Preemption Now?, 27 TORT & INS.
L. J. 523 (1992); Robin E. Margolis, Is ERISA Preemption the Health Insurance "Wrecking
Ball"?, 10 No. 2 HEALTHSPAN 24 (1993); Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal
Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19 AMER. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993).
4. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... .
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
7. The statute specifically prescribes that ERISA plans may be established "through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). See, e.g., International
Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1991) (employer that
furnishes group medical insurance through multi-employer trust within scope of ERISA);
Brundage-Peterson v. Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1989)
("barebones" plan to pay employees' medical insurance premiums is within scope of ERISA);
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372-75 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (multi-employer trust within
scope of ERISA duties); Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
8. In self-funded plans, employers decline to contract with private insurance companies
or HMOs and instead assume the risk of paying health benefit claims out of a pool of money set
aside for that purpose. In some respects, self-insured employers thus operate much the same way
that private insurance companies do. To handle claims management functions, however, employers
often contract with third-party administrators.
9. ERISA directives do not apply to certain plans. These include governmental plans;
church plans, excess benefit plans, plans maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws,
and plans maintained outside of the United States primarily for the benefit of persons who are non-
resident aliens. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(l)-(5) (1988).
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prescribes only limited substantive regulation to ensure fair and equitable
practices by employers, insurers and providers of health care. 1' Thus,
ironically, the ever broadening scope of ERISA pre-emption has come at the
expense of the very participants in employee benefit plans whom ERISA was
intended to protect. 12
For example, courts have construed ERISA pre-emption in a manner that
leaves plan participants and beneficiaries without redress when those
administering employer-sponsored health insurance plans act negligently and
cause injury. In Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. ,1" the plaintiffs brought
a wrongful death claim based on negligence committed in the utilization review
process. The plaintiffs were insured through an ERISA plan administered by
Blue Cross & Blue Shield ("Blue Cross"). Blue Cross contracted with the
defendant United Healthcare to perform utilization review and thereby handle
the preauthorization process. Despite the attenuated connection between the
employer and United Healthcare, the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA pre-empted
the negligence claim against United Healthcare for denying
10. The scope of ERISA pre-emption is complicated by a savings clause, which excepts
from pre-emption any law which regulates insurance, banking or securities. 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A) (ERISA shall not "be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."). See generally, Karen A. Jordan,
ERISA Pre-emption: Integrating Fabe into the Savings Claise Analysis, -- Rutgers L.J. --
(forthcoming 1996). The pre-emption provisions also include a "deemer clause," which qualifies
the savings clause by prescribing that employee benefit plans may not be characterized as an
insurance company and regulated by the state through insurance laws. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
(an ERISA plan "shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to
be engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts . . . . "). Because of the savings clause,
states can try to increase access to health care and control costs by enacting reforms in the health
insurance market. However, the deemer clause seriously limits the reach of such reforms because
it precludes application of such reforms to self-insured plans.
11. ERISA does not address many issues that have been at the heart of the recent health
reform debate, such as pre-existing condition limits, universal coverage, and managed care. When
it does address concerns of plan participants and beneficiaries, relief under ERISA is fairly
circumscribed; claimants are limited to contractual relief. Punitive damages and extra-contractual
damages such as damages for emotional distress are not available. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
See also William K. Carr & Robert L. Liebross, Wrong Without Rights: The Need for a Strong
Federal Common Law ofERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 221 (Winter 1992-93); Norman Stein,
ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (1993).
12. Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries by requiring the disclosure and reporting of financial and other
information, "by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal courts." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988). However, ERISA's substantive protections
focus on pension plans. There is virtually no substantive regulation directed at health benefit plans
or other welfare plans.
13. 965 F.2d 1321, 1329-34 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Corcoran]. See infra notes 291-
300 for more detailed discussion.
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hospitalization-even though the plaintiffs were left without a remedy.' 4 A
logical extension of Corcoran's rationale would similarly result in pre-emption
of legislative regulation of the utilization review process, which many states
have adopted in recent years in an effort to prevent negligent review
procedures. 5
Moreover, the interests of health care consumers have been compromised
by lower court decisions broadly construing ERISA as pre-empting significant
aspects of state health reform efforts. ERISA has long been recognized as a
barrier to state reform strategies-such as employer mandates or pay-or-play
incentives-that require or encourage employers to provide health insurance.' 6
Similarly, although states can require insurers to provide standard benefits
packages,' 7 ERISA's pre-emption provisions block such measures from
benefiting many consumers by shielding employers who decide to self-insure
from the application of such laws.'" Preclusion of these basic measures
addressing the growing problems of uninsurance and underinsurance is
significant, but arguably unavoidable due to Congress's express intent to leave
control over employee benefits with the employer.
More recently, however, ERISA pre-emption has been used to challenge
even those reform strategies that have a much more tenuous connection with
employers: specifically, state efforts to alleviate the problem of
"uncompensated" care provided by hospitals to the indigent and uninsured
through a process of assessments on hospitals and proportionate
redistributions; 9 taxes imposed on health care providers which can be used
14. Id. at 1333 ("[W]e are not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the pre-
emption clause leaves a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in
employee benefits plans . . ").
15. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 374.510 (Vernon 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
211.461-.466 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
16. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-109 (1983) (discussed in
more detail infra note 42 and accompanying text). See also, Standard Oil Co. of California v.
Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763-66 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, which
requires employers in the state to provide employees with health coverage and to pay one-half
of the premium, pre-empted).
17. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733, 739-47
(1985) (although such laws "relate to" ERISA plans, laws regulating "insurance" are exempt from
pre-emption through the savings clause).
18. ERISA's "deemer clause" prevents self-funded plans from being subjected to state
insurance regulation which may be costly in implement. See supra note 10. Thus, there is often
a financial incentive to self-insure. Most large employers that can self-insure, do so. See Laura
J. Schnacht, The Health Care Crisis: Improving Access for Employees Covered by Self-Insured
Health Plans Under ERISA and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 45 J. URBAN & CONTEMP.
L. 303 (1994); Kevin Caster, Note, The Future of Self-Funded Health Plans, 79 IOWA L. REV.
413 (1994) (citing Eric Zicklin, More Employers Self Insure Their Medical Plans, Survey Finds,
Bus. & HEALTH, Apr. 1992, at 74).
19. See, e.g., New England Health Care Employees Union Dist. 1199 v. Mount Sinai
Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 190 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding state tax pre-empted), rev'd, 65 F.3d 1024
(2d Cir. 1995) (overruled in light of Travelers decision). ERISA also interferes with state efforts
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to increase federal Medicaid matching funds; 21 state laws regulating the
formation of managed care organizations; 21 and well-established hospital rate-
setting programs designed to control rising health care costs. 22 Strategies such
as these are designed to address specific problems in our health care system,
and pre-emption would leave states with few effective alternatives. Due to the
tenuous connection with employers or ERISA plans, pre-emption of these state
laws is questionable.
ERISA pre-emption has been extended to the point that state reform
efforts may be seriously hindered. Yet, legislative modifications at the federal
level aimed at adjusting the balance between the interests of ERISA plan
participants, employers, and states coping with health care reform are unlikely.
Rather, the trend at the federal level may be to extend the benefits ERISA
provides to large employers which self-insure to smaller employers.' It is
therefore up to the judiciary to develop sound doctrines that ensure that ERISA
pre-emption is kept within the bounds that Congress intended in 1974.
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to address the parameters
of ERISA pre-emption in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.24 In Travelers, commercial insurers
and an HMO association challenged New York's hospital rate-setting
provisions. The rate-setting scheme directs hospitals to add surcharges to the
bills of patients covered through commercial insurance or HMOs. The result
is that some payers, such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, incur lower
hospital charges. The increased costs caused by the surcharges can be passed
along to ERISA plans through increased premiums or subscription fees.
Because of this indirect economic effect, the insurers and HMO association
argued that the rate-setting provisions "related to" ERISA plans. The Supreme
to tax insurance premiums as a way of paying for uncompensated care. See "Legislation: Major
Battle Looming Over ERISA, Former Bush Health Official Predicts," BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY,
Nov. 18, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 11/18/94 HCD d4.
20. See, eg., Boyle v. Anderson, 849 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Minn. 1994) (addressing pre-
emption of a 2% provider tax enacted as part of Minnesota's Health Right Act).
21. See, e.g., Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500 (4th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that Virginia law that prohibits insurers
from unreasonably discriminating against providers willing to meet terms and conditions of
preferred provider organization "relates to" ERISA plans, but is saved from pre-emption because
it is a state insurance law); cf. CIGNA Health plan of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana, 883 F. Supp.
94 (M.D. La. 1995) (state "any willing provider" law that applies to self-insured plans pre-empted
by ERISA).
22. See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of cases
addressing ERISA pre-emption of these health care initiatives.
23. See, Speakers Differ Over Possible Health Care Amendments to ERISA, BNA HEALTH
CARE DAILY, Feb. 15, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 2/15/95 HCD d6.
24. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers].
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Court held that this effect on ERISA plans did not warrant pre-emption.25
More importantly, the Court's opinion in Travelers can be construed as
sending a signal for judicial restraint when determining whether state laws are
pre-empted by ERISA. The Court's approach in resolving the issue in
Travelers and its emphasis on fundamental premises such as the presumption
against pre-emption of health care regulations can be construed as suggesting
that courts should engage in a more pragmatic and disciplined analysis of
ERISA pre-emption issues. This article explores the scope of ERISA pre-
emption after Travelers and argues that many state laws found by lower courts
to be pre-empted could not have been within the realm of Congress's intent
in 1974. Proponents of broad ERISA pre-emption will undoubtedly disagree.
However, a strong argument can be made that harmonizing Travelers with
Supreme Court precedent results in a framework for analyzing pre-emption
questions that effectively ensures that ERISA pre-emption is restrained within
the bounds that Congress intended in 1974.
This article first examines the Supreme Court's ERISA pre-emption cases
before Travelers, with the following goals: to define the categories of laws
found to "relate to" ERISA plans; to identify statements that support liberal
findings of pre-emption only if taken out of context; and to explore the Court's
statements concerning the outer bounds of ERISA pre-emption. Second, the
article analyzes the impact of Travelers on the pre-emption analysis, explains
how the opinion can be construed as a signal that the scope of ERISA should
be restrained, and articulates a framework for the pre-emption analysis after
Travelers. Lastly, the article assesses the effectiveness of the Travelers
framework on restraining the scope of ERISA pre-emption by applying it to
emerging pre-emption issues, namely cases involving provider taxes and
contract and tort claims.
I. ERISA Pre-emption: The Scope of the Phrase "Relate To" Before
Travelers
Section 514(a) of ERISA prescribes that ERISA "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan ... ."6 While the full scope of ERISA pre-emption is modified
by the savings and deemer clauses,27 the outer bounds of ERISA pre-emption
are guided by this key language. The split in the circuits that led to the
Travelers decision hinged on the proper application of this pre-emption phrase
to the rate-setting provisions at issue. The Supreme Court has addressed the
25. See infra notes 155-86 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of the holding
in Travelers.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
27. See supra note 10.
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scope of ERISA pre-emption in many cases, but had never held that an indirect
economic impact on ERISA plans could alone justify a finding that a state law
related to the ERISA plan. However, many lower courts had reached that
conclusion by drawing upon the Supreme Court's generally broad approach
to ERISA pre-emption.2" This section of the article explains the prior
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning the scope of the phrase "relate to,"
as well as the application of the Court's pronouncements by the courts of
appeals in Travelers and United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare
Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp.
29
A. Supreme Court Pronouncements
Congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone of any pre-emption
analysis.3" However, because of the separate spheres of governmental authority
preserved in our federalist system, courts must presume that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt traditional state regulation absent some clear indication
otherwise." Congress's intent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."3 2 The Supreme
Court recently clarified that, where an express pre-emption provision provides
a "'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, .
• .there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from
the substantive provisions' of the legislation. "3 ERISA contains an express
pre-emption provision: ERISA supersedes state laws that "relate to" ERISA-
covered plans.34 An initial issue, then, is whether the phrase "relate to" is
a "reliable indicium" of Congress's intent. Prior Supreme Court cases
addressing questions of ERISA pre-emption have implicitly indicated that the
phrase is not a reliable indicium. That is, the Court has always looked to the
structure of the ERISA statute as a whole, as well as to the pre-emption
provisions, and to ERISA's legislative history.
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries by requiring the disclosure and
reporting of financial and other information, "by establishing standards of
28. See, e.g., infra notes 341-46 and accompanying text (discussion of cases in which
lower courts have held that indirect economic impact suffices for pre-emption).
29. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter United Wire], cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382,
and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 383 (1993).
30. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (citing Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhormn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
31. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
32. Id. at 525.
33. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (quoting, respectively, Malone
v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) and California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.)).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
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conduct, responsibility, and obligations for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to [the] Federal courts."35  ERISA's protections therefore address
administrative concerns rather than provide any substantive right to benefits.
According to the Court, the pre-emption provision was intended to assure
uniform regulation that would minimize the inefficiencies associated with the
administration of plans in more than one state. 6 "Pre-emption ensures that
the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single
set of regulations. ""
Despite the primary focus on administrative concerns, Supreme Court
cases before Travelers broadly interpreted the phrase "relate to" as
encompassing any state law that has "a connection with or reference to . . .
a[n employee benefit] plan. "" The Court has stated that ERISA's pre-emption
extends beyond state laws specifically directed at employee benefit plans or
laws that deal with the subject matters covered by ERISA.39 ERISA may even
pre-empt state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive
requirements.40  Notably, however, the Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged in its consideration of ERISA pre-emption prior to Travelers
that the laws at issue did not present particularly hard questions. Rather, the
laws either imposed a duty upon ERISA plans through express reference to
ERISA plans in the state laws, or the laws impacted on ERISA plans directly,
or if indirectly, in a substantial way. None of the laws caused only indirect
economic effects on ERISA plans.
1. Laws Found to "Relate To" ERISA Plans
The Court has found many state laws to be within the scope of the phrase
"relates to." Analysis of the cases reveals that, prior to Travelers, certain types
of laws had been found to have a sufficient relation to ERISA plans to warrant
pre-emption: laws that specifically apply to ERISA plans; laws that impose a
duty on ERISA plans by referencing ERISA plans; laws that mandate specific
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
36. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1987).
37. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650).
38. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463
U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)). See generally Engel, supra note 3.
39. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 58-59 (limiting the pre-emption clause to state
laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA would be incompatible with both Houses'
rejection of pre-emption clauses that contained such a limitation).
40. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (citing Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988) (ERISA pre-empted state garnishment statute even though it
was enacted to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes).
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benefit structures or prohibit a method of determining the level of benefits; or
common law actions that are within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions.
The clearest case for pre-emption is found where state laws were
designed specifically to apply to ERISA plans or where state laws directly or
indirectly mandate that employers provide specific coverage to employees
through their ERISA plans. Such laws are plainly inconsistent with Congress's
intent. Thus, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., the Court
held that a Georgia statute which barred the garnishment of funds or benefits
of an ERISA plan "related to" ERISA plans.4' The law was designed to and
solely applied to ERISA plans. Similarly, in District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Board of Trade, a District of Columbia workers' compensation
provision was found to relate to ERISA plans.42 The District of Columbia
provision prescribed that employers who provide health insurance coverage
for an employee must provide health insurance coverage equivalent to the
existing coverage of the employee while the employee receives or is eligible
to receive workers' compensation benefits.43 Thus, a duty was imposed on
employers through the statute's reference to ERISA plans.
Several Supreme Court cases involved laws that were inconsistent with
Congress's desire to leave all control with the employer over decisions about
whether to offer benefits and, if so, what level of benefits to provide to
employees. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Court found that the two state
laws at issue related to ERISA plans: (1) human rights laws which prohibited
employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy; and (2) disability benefit laws which
required employers to pay sick leave benefits to employees unable to work
because of pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities.' Similarly, in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the Court held that a state-
mandated benefit law, which prescribed the substantive content of health
insurance policies that insurers could offer, indirectly related to ERISA
plans.45 The laws in these cases mandated specific benefit structures.
41. 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988) (pre-empted because the statute "referenced" ERISA
plans, and was specifically designed to affect such plans).
42. 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992).
43. Id. at 583. Justice Thomas expressly held that the D.C. statute specifically "refers to"
welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone was pre-empted. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens noted that although the Supreme Court had previously stated that a law
is within the scope of the phrase "relates to" if it has a connection with or "reference to" such
a plan-"until today that broad reading of the phrase has not been necessary to support any of
this Court's actual holdings." Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (related to ERISA plans because the laws mandated
benefits).
45. 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (related to ERISA plans because a mandated benefit
requirement bears indirectly but substantially on all insured benefit plans).
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Other laws considered by the Court have affected the administrative
practices relating to calculating benefits for ERISA plans. Because of
Congress's concern for preventing administrative inefficiencies in plan
operations, the Court has readily found such laws to relate to ERISA plans.
For example, in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, the Court held that a Pennsylvania
provision precluding a right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's
tort recovery with respect to benefits payable from health benefit plans related
to ERISA plans.' Similarly, a provision in New Jersey's workers'
compensation act which prohibited employers from setting-off amounts
received through workers' compensation against retirement pension benefits
was found to relate to ERISA plans in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.47
The state laws in FMC Corp. and Alessi were viewed as eliminating one
method of calculating benefits. For example, each law would affect an
employer's decision to limit the level of benefits provided by way of offsets
or subrogation. The laws would not require the employer to provide a greater
level of benefits because the employer could simply select an alternative
method to limit benefits, such as estimating the annual amounts involved and
correspondingly lowering benefit levels across-the-board. Thus, the laws
merely complicated the means of calculating the level of benefits which the
employer wished to provide.4" This type of regulation readily falls within the
scope of Congress's concern about administrative inefficiencies because the
employer would be required to calculate benefits differently in certain states.
Lastly, because the definition of "State law" encompasses "all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law,"49
the Supreme Court has held that ERISA pre-empts two state law causes of
action. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,0 the Supreme Court readily
determined that ERISA pre-empted state common law tort and contract claims
based on allegedly improper processing of a claim under an insured employee
benefit plan.5 The Court in Pilot Life stressed that the state claims essentially
46. 498 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1990) (antisubrogation law contained a "reference" to benefit
plans and had a connection with such plans because it posed the risk of subjecting plan
administrators to conflicting state regulations) [hereinafter FMC Corp.].
47. 451 U.S. 504, 524 (1981) (the law "related to" an ERISA plan because it eliminated
a method of calculating pension benefits that is expressly permitted by ERISA) [hereinafter Alessi].
48. In FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 59-60, the Court found a sufficient connection with ERISA
plans because such state laws would complicate the administration of nationwide plans by requiring
an employer to consider state law when designing the plan. Employers would have to calculate
benefit levels in the states based on expected liability conditions that differ from those in states
without similar anti-subrogation legislation. The Court stated that pre-emption was proper where
a patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce "considerable inefficiencies" in benefit program
operation.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1988).
50. 481 U.S. 41 (1987) [hereinafter Pilot Life].
51. Id. at 47-48.
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sought relief within ERISA's civil enforcement provision; i.e., the action was
a claim for benefits under the plan.52 The Court stated that subjecting
employers to varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of
ERISA's enforcement provision 3 would pose an obstacle to the objectives
of Congress."
More recently, in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,5" the Court
examined a state common law action for wrongful discharge. The Texas courts
had created an exception to the doctrine of at-will employment where an
employee was unlawfully discharged primarily because of the employer's
desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension
fund. The Court held that the cause of action was within the scope of ERISA's
pre-emption clause because the existence of an ERISA plan is a critical factor
in establishing liability under the newly created cause of action.5 6 However,
the Court was also influenced by the fact that the action purported to provide
a remedy expressly prescribed by ERISA's enforcement provisions.5 7
In sum, laws that have been found to be within the scope of ERISA pre-
52. Id. at 52,
53. Section 502(a) permits a plan participant or beneficiary to sue to recover benefits due
under the plan, to enforce rights under the plan, to clarify rights to future benefits or for breach
of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Relief may take the form of accrued
benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, an injunction against a plan
administrator's refusal to pay, or removal of a fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988 & Supp.
1992).
54. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987). ("The civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) is one
of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of ERISA"). The Court noted that the
enforcement scheme 'represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit
plans." Id. at 54. The Court determined that these policy choices would be undermined if ERISA
participants and beneficiaries could obtain remedies under state laws that were rejected in ERISA.
Id. The Court was influenced by legislative history indicating that claims under ERISA were to
be dealt with comparably to actions under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.
Id. Congress also made clear that it intended a body of federal substantive law to be developed
by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans. Id. at 55-56. See infra notes 284-88, 296-309 and accompanying text for a more detailed
.discussion.
55. 498 U.S. 133 (1990) [hereinafter Ingersoll-Rand].
56. Id. at 139-40 (the Texas cause of action makes specific reference to and is premised
on the existence of a pension plan. Because the court's inquiry must be directed to the plan, this
judicially created cause of action relates to an ERISA plan, i.e., there is no cause of action if there
is no plan). That is, the duty imposed upon an employer only arises if there is an ERISA plan and
is imposed by reference to the ERISA plan. Although District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd.
of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992) was decided after this case, that opinion's principle works here
as well. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
57. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142-45. The Court also noted that it was foreseeable that
state courts exercising their common law powers might develop different substantive standards
applicable to this type of employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct
to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction. The Court thus believed that this cause of action
would be at odds with ERISA's goal of uniformity and that resulting inefficiencies could work
to the detriment of plan beneficiaries. Id. at 142.
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emption are generally; (1) laws that specifically apply to ERISA plans, or
which impose a duty on ERISA plans by referencing ERISA plans; (2)
common law actions that are within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions; or (3) laws that mandate specific benefit structures or prohibit a
method of determining the level of benefits. Further, the purpose of the laws
found to be pre-empted was generally to impose a benefit-related requirement
upon employers." g
However, in reaching its decisions in the pre-emption cases, the Court
sometimes made statements that, if taken out of the context of the entire case,
would arguably support pre-emption of other types of laws. For example, in
Mackey .v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.5 9 and Greater
Washington Board of Trade,6" the Court emphasized that the statutes at issue
"referred to" ERISA plans. In Ingersoll-Rand the Court made the statement
that, "[b] ecause the court's inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially
created cause of action 'relates to' an ERISA plan. "61 Further, in Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, discussed in the following section, the Court noted that
pre-emption may be appropriate where state laws cause inefficiencies in the
administrative scheme that might cause employers to reduce benefits or to
refrain from creating plans.62 Yet the force of these statements is generally
tempered by thorough and careful scrutiny of the cases. For example, in
Greater Washington Board of Trade, the Court arguably clarified its prior
statements that "reference to" a plan warrants pre-emption. The Court stated
that "any state law imposing requirements by reference to such covered
programs must yield to ERISA." 63 Thus, a mere reference is not
sufficient-the consequence of the reference must be to impose a benefit-related
duty.
Parties challenging laws as being pre-empted, however, have relied on
this dicta as well as the Court's generally sweeping pronouncements that
Congress intended the phrase "relate to" to be given a broad interpretation,
and have been very successful in convincing lower courts that a multitude of
other types of state laws are pre-empted as well. Most troubling is the
increasing pre-emption of state common law causes of action against insurers,
58. E.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (state law mandated sick
leave benefits); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (state law
mandated mental health benefits); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (purpose of law
precluding subrogation from a tort claimant's recovery was to prevent employers or insurers from
depriving claimants of benefits of tort litigation). The purpose of these laws is distinguishable from
the purpose underlying the state law at issue in Travelers which was enacted to promote health
policy objectives. See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
59. 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988).
60. 113 S. Ct. 580, 583 (1992) [hereinafter Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade].
61. 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990).
62. 482 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1987).
63. 113 S. Ct. 580, 584 (1992).
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HMOs, and even providers of health care, grounded in negligence or
malpractice.' The appropriateness of pre-emption of such laws is questionable,
especially given the fundamental premise that state laws within the traditional
police power should not be pre-empted absent clear congressional intent.
The questionable nature of pre-emption in such cases is evidenced by the
inconsistency in lower court opinions resulting from a few courts which have
refused to find pre-emption. 65 The following section demonstrates that the
continuing trend of broadening ERISA pre-emption is not required by Supreme
Court pronouncements, and indeed, may be a consequence of superficial
scrutiny of Supreme Court cases and of the underlying rationale for pre-
emption.
2. Limitations on the Scope of the Phrase "Relate To"
The Supreme Court acknowledged in virtually all of the cases outlined
in the preceding section that the determination whether the particular state laws
at issue "related to" ERISA plans was not difficult. 66 Thus, although the
Court has often reiterated that there is a limitation to the broad reach of
ERISA's pre-emption, the Court has never been required to clarify the outer
bounds of the phrase "relate to." The limitation was first mentioned in a
footnote in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.: pre-emption does not occur if the
state law has only a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection with covered
plans.67 However, only two cases prior to Travelers involved state laws that
the Court held did not "relate to" ERISA plans.
In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. ,68 the Court
concluded that ERISA pre-emption does not bar a proceeding against a plan
under a state's general garnishment statute, even though plan trustees are
64. See, e.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1994).
65. Indeed, the inconsistencies in lower court opinions could be described as demonstrating
utter confusion on the pre-emption issue.
66. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (case did not
require the Court to "determine the outer bounds of pre-emption"); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (state laws "clearly" related to ERISA plans); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731 (1985) (state law "clearly" relates to ERISA plans; bears
indirectly but substantially on all insured plans); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
47 (1987) (no dispute that the common law actions "relate to" ERISA plans); Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (no difficulty in concluding that common law action
"relates to" an ERISA plan); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct.
580, 583 (1992) (law specifically refers to welfare benefit plans and on that basis alone is pre-
empted).
67. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 (citing American Tel. and Tel.
Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (state garnishment of a spouse's pension income
to enforce alimony and support orders is not pre-empted)). See also District of Columbia v.
Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. at 583 n.1.
68. 486 U.S. 825 (1988) [hereinafter Mackey].
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served with a garnishment summons, become parties to a suit and must respond
and deposit the demanded funds due to the beneficiary debtor.69 The Court
was influenced by language in ERISA and by procedural considerations.
Because ERISA expressly prescribes that plans may "sue and be sued,"7 the
Court determined that Congress must have contemplated the execution of
judgments won against plans. 7 Yet ERISA does not prescribe a procedure
for execution of judgments, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct
courts to defer to state law.72 The Court therefore found that state law
methods for collecting judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed
by ERISA.73
Mackey demonstrates that a law can have a "tenuous, remote, or
peripheral" connection with covered plans even if the law causes substantial
administrative burdens and economic effects on ERISA plans.' The Court
was not persuaded by the dissent's recitation of burdens such as identifying
participants who owe money to the garnishor, calculating participants'
maximum entitlements from the plan funds, determining particular amounts
owed to the garnishor, making payments into state court, assessing the validity
and priority of garnishments, litigating garnishment issues, and being subject
to multiple garnishment orders under various state laws.7" The Court's
holding therefore reflects a pragmatic approach to assessing congressional
intent regarding the scope of ERISA pre-emption.
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,76 presented an easier case for the
Court. The case involved a state law requiring employers to provide a one-time
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing. The Court
held that the law was not within the scope of the phrase "relate to" because,
although the law related to "benefits," it did not relate to ERISA "plans," i.e.,
the employer's obligation was to make a one-time, lump-sum payment which
would not require an ongoing administrative program.77 Thus, the Court did
not -have to elaborate on the outer bounds of the phrase "relate to."
Nonetheless, the Court did so by explaining that pre-emption should further
69. Id. at 831-32.
70. Id. at 833. Under § 502(d), a plan may sue and be sued, both as to actions pursuant
to § 502 as well as run-of-the mill state law claims, including actions for torts committed by an
ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
71. 486 U.S. at 833. The Court also cited language of ERISA indicating that Congress
did not intend to bar state law attachment of plan benefits. Id. at 835-37 (citing § 206(d)(1)).
72. See FED. R. CIv. PROC. 69(a) (in the absence of an applicable federal statute, "[t]he
procedure on execution .. .shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state
in which the district court is held .... 2).
73. 486 U.S. at 833-34.
74. Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. 482 U.S. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Fort Halifax].
77. Id. at 12.
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Congress's purpose in enacting ERISA's pre-emption provisions. The Court
reiterated that Congress's fundamental purpose for enacting ERISA was to
ensure the administrative integrity of ERISA plans,7" and that the purpose of
pre-emption was to ensure that employers and sponsors were subject to a
uniform set of regulations regarding administrative practices, thereby
preventing inefficiencies in the administrative scheme of a plan which might
lead some employers to reduce benefits or to refrain from creating plans.79
Further, the Court noted that administrative obligations relevant to ERISA
plans include determining eligibility, calculating benefit levels, making
disbursements, monitoring plan funds, and record keeping."0
Thus, the Supreme Court's notion of administrative practices relevant to
the pre-emption question encompasses practices directly related to providing
benefits-i.e., health care coverage-to plan participants or beneficiaries. This
is supported by the holding in Mackey that other practices or functions-even
substantial ones-performed by administrators of a plan are not always relevant
to the question of pre-emption. Because the state law at issue did not raise the
types of concerns that prompted ERISA pre-emption, holding that the law was
not pre-empted was justified even though the law required employers to
provide a benefit to employees and thereby could potentially cause some
employers to consider a reduction in other benefits to offset the severance pay.
Together, Mackey and Fort Halifax indicate that use by lower courts of
broad statements in the Court's dicta to justify pre-emption may be unfounded
in many cases. For example, although the Court has stated that pre-emption
may be appropriate where state laws cause inefficiencies in the administrative
scheme that might cause employers to reduce benefits or to refrain from
creating plans,"' Mackey and Fort Halifax suggest that the scope of the
relevant administrative scheme may be fairly narrow.8 2 Further, if the burden
placed on plan administrators in Mackey did not warrant pre-emption, pre-
emption cannot be justified merely because a court may need to look to plan
documents to resolve the claim. Instead, both Mackey and Fort Halifax suggest
a pragmatic approach to drawing the line delimiting whether a state law has
a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection with ERISA plans or whether
the law "relates to" ERISA plans. That is, to determine the outer bounds of
ERISA pre-emption, courts must accord due regard to traditional state
regulation, and carefully balance the promotion of ERISA objectives with the
practical consequences of a finding of pre-emption.
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 9-11.
80. Id. at 9.
81. See e.g., id. at 11.
82. See also infra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
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B. Inconsistencies in Applying Supreme Court Precedent
Despite the fact that the Court has reiterated numerous times that its
holdings do not reflect the precise boundaries of ERISA's pre-emption clause,
lower courts have latched onto the Court's broad language and have extended
ERISA's pre-emptive effect much further than is required by the Supreme
Court's holdings. Yet courts have generally failed to engage in a critical
analysis of the Court's decisions. In particular, they have failed to heed the
Supreme Court's signals to use a pragmatic approach in finding the line
delimiting ERISA pre-emption. Instead, courts often find pre-emption because
enforcing the law might require "looking at plan documents" or because the
law in some way affects "administration of the plan." Further, where a state
law has the potential to have some economic effect on ERISA plans, lower
courts have justified pre-emption by noting that the state law might cause
employers to reduce benefits or to refrain from creating plans.8 3 And perhaps
most troubling, some lower courts have tended to accord very little deference
to the fact that the state law at issue may be one within an area of traditional
state regulation."
As a result, ERISA's negative impact on the health care system has
become intolerable. In addition to state laws such as those at issue in the
Supreme Court cases, lower courts have found the following state actions pre-
empted: actions by plan participants alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of
the level of benefits under a policy; 5 actions alleging that insurers' conduct
violated insurance related statutes or common law doctrines;86 actions by plan
participants injured by negligent commission of utilization review
procedures;87 actions by health care providers against plan administrators for
inducing the provision of services by wrongfully failing to inform them that
reimbursement would not be available; 8 malpractice actions by plan
83. See, e.g., Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993). See also infra notes
341-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of such cases.
84. See, e.g., Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., 947 F.2d 1341,
1350 (8th Cir. 1941).
85. See, e.g., Farlow v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(rejecting state action where plaintiff claimed insurer negligently failed to disclose that its policy
did not provide maternity and pregnancy coverage and fraudulently misrepresented the fact that
the policy's coverage was coextensive with the claimant's former policy).
86. See, e.g., International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294,
298-301 (6th Cir. 1991) (pre-empting state actions based on tort of bad faith insurance practices,
common law prohibition on insurance policy once liability has attached, and code provision
prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices in the business of insurance). However, the claim that
the conversion policy did not conform with state statute was not pre-empted. Id.
87. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
88. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2 (1992).
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participants or beneficiaries against providers; 9 and actions for vicarious or
direct negligence against managed care organizations. 9'
Moreover, state reform provisions, innovative as well as established
practices, are now at risk of pre-emption. In addition to rate-setting legislation
such as that in issue in Travelers, long a key component of state health policy
as a cost containment mechanism, provider taxes, used to increase federal
funds for Medicaid programs, and assessments collected from and redistributed
to hospitals to compensate for the cost of providing care to those unable to
pay, have been challenged and often caught in ERISA's pre-emptive web. 91
And where pre-emption of the law has left a plaintiff without a remedy for
often blatantly unjust conduct by a defendant such as an insurer, an HMO or
a provider of care, lower courts often recite the Supreme Court's statement
that lack of a remedy does not justify permitting the action to proceed.92 In
many of these cases, pre-emption was based at least in part upon the indirect
economic impact on ERISA plans. Courts have found it sufficient for pre-
emption that a state law causes an increased cost that may be passed on to a
plan, thereby perhaps prompting an employer or plan sponsor to reduce
benefits. Given the limitations of the Supreme Court cases, however,
inconsistencies have inevitably arisen.93
The split in the Circuit Courts on the issue of whether ERISA pre-empts
state hospital, rate-setting schemes such as those in New York and New Jersey
is a prime example of inconsistent interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
In Travelers, the Second Circuit held that New York's rate-setting provisions
were pre-empted.94 Moreover, the Second Circuit expressly declined to follow
the Third Circuit's holding in United Wire, Metal and Machine Health and
Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hospital,95 which held that New
Jersey's substantially similar rate-setting scheme was not pre-empted. The
89. See. e.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
90. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Servs. Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md.
1994).
91. See, e.g., New England Health Care Employees Union Dist. 1199 v. Mount Sinai
Hosp, 846 F. Supp. 190 (D. Conn. 1994), rev'd, 65 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) (overruled after
Travelers).
92. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992).
See also infra notes 290-321 for a discussion of the appropriateness of this justification.
93. Compare New England Health Care Employees Union District 1199 v. Mount Sinai
Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 190 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding state tax pre-empted), rev'd, 65 F.3d 1024
(2d Cir. 1995) (overruled in light of Travelers decision) with Boyle v. Anderson, 849 F. Supp.
1307 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding tax not pre-empted); compare Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857
F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding state negligence claim pre-empted), rev'd on other
grounds, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that action was not removable because negligence
claim was not within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)) with Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, 859 F.
Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (state negligence claim not pre-empted).
94. 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1994).
95. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
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following subsections describe the state laws at issue in these cases and explain
the courts' underlying rationales.
1. The Hospital Rate-Setting Legislation at Issue
The rate-setting provisions at issue in Travelers and United Wire share
the key characteristic of being based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG)
methodology developed for use by the Medicare program. The DRG
methodology is a case-based system which requires hospitals to charge fixed
rates for each patient treated, based upon the patient's diagnosis rather than
on the actual cost of the services.96 The rate for services is therefore
determined prospectively, rather than through a retrospective review of hospital
charges. Further, the DRG rate for hospital services is an average rate and
therefore often lower than actual charges would be.97 Both systems also
differentiated among types of payer.
The in-patient hospital reimbursement system used by the state of New
York9" sets the rates that hospitals may charge various payers. Travelers
Insurance and other commercial insurers instituted the challenge99 to the rate-
setting scheme because it requires hospitals to charge a higher rate when billing
commercial insurers than when billing other payers. New York's
reimbursement system categorizes payers into three groups. The first consists
of state government as payer for Medicaid patients, Article forty-three
corporations (e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield plans) and HMOs."° The
second group consists of self-insured funds that pay hospitals directly, and
96. The DRG rate in New York is determined by the State Department of Health. N.Y.
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(3) (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1995). Similar to the DRG
reimbursement system used by Medicare, the DRG rate which a hospital may charge is based upon
the cost of treating an average patient with a particular primary diagnosis. Id. Under the Medicare
DRG system, each diagnosis falls into one of 491 categories, known as diagnostic related groups.
Each category is assigned a weight which reflects the intensity of treatment required for an average
patient with that primary diagnosis. Hospitals thus receive a predetermined amount for the care
rendered to each patient, regardless of the actual resources expended. The system is a cost
containment measure because it creates an incentive for hospitals to use their resources efficiently.
See generally MARK A. HALL, HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW, FINANCING AND LIABILITY
§2.2.3 (1994).
97. See generally, David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and
Organizational Rationality, l0 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (1993); David M. Frankford, The Complexity
of Medicare's Hospital Reimbursement System: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517
(1993).
98. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1995).
99. The commercial insurers, as fiduciaries for ERISA plans, brought suit against Mario
Cuomo (the State) and New York Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans et al.
intervened. The New York State Health Maintenance Organization Conference also joined the
action. All parties to the proceeding before the Supreme Court appear in the caption of the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993).
100. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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certain licensed commercial insurers.' The third group consists of all other
payers, including self-pay patients, patients covered by self-insured groups that
do not make direct payments to hospitals, and patients covered by commercial
insurance policies that do not pay on an expense incurred basis. 0 2
The reimbursement scheme regulates what the hospitals must charge
payers on the basis of the category which the payer falls into. Category three
is the least regulated-hospitals may charge these payers the actual hospital
charges subject only to a statutory limit.'0 3 Hospital charges to payers in the
other two categories are determined by use of the DRG methodology. Payers
in category one are charged only the DRG rate."° In contrast, payers in
category two, such as commercial insurers, must be charged the DRG rate plus
a 13% surcharge.0 5 In addition, from April 1992 through March 1993,
hospitals were required to charge payers in category two an additional
11 %. ' The rate-setting system also imposes an additional 9% assessment
upon HMOs that fail to enroll a target number of Medicaid patients.'0 7
It is notable that New York's rate-setting scheme was explicitly designed
to achieve specific health policy objectives, in particular, to help ensure the
continued viability of plans such as Blue Cross & Blue Shield and HMOs,
whose underwriting practices enable higher risk individuals to obtain affordable
health coverage. Further, this system merely evolved from the practice
established in the private health care market. Specifically, the use of the 13%
differential evolved from non-regulatory, market-initiated practices which had
existed for years in support of Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.
Some historical information is relevant to an understanding of New
101. That is, those whose coverage is based on all hospital services rendered. This
category also includes volunteer firefighters and volunteer ambulance companies, and no-fault
insurance. Id. § 2807-c(1)(b).
102. Id. § 2807-c(1)(c). Thus, the rate-setting scheme reaches all payers except those
provided to Medicare beneficiaries.
103. The statutory limit is 120% of the rate charged to payers in category two. Id. § 2807-
c(l)(c).
104. However, HMOs are permitted to negotiate their payments to the hospital. Id. § 2807-
c(2)(b)(i).
105. Id. § 2807-c(1)(b). The result is a rate that is 113% of the DRG rate.
106. See Brief for Petitioners Blue Cross & Blue Shield at 9, Travelers, 115 S. Ct. 1671
(No. 93-1408) (citing 1992 N.Y. Laws, ch. 55, 348).
107. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2-a) (McKinney Supp. 1995). Notably, the
HMOs that are parties to the action challenged only this 9% differential; they took no position
on the 13% differential. Unlike the other aspects of New York's reimbursement system, the 9%
assessment does not impact the amount a hospital may charge an HMO, but, instead, is assessed
against the aggregate costs of in-patient hospital care that HMOs pay on behalf of their non-
Medicaid members. The 9% assessment is remitted to an agent of the state, who then deposits
the money into New York's general fund. The 11% differential, although charged by the hospitals,
is also ultimately deposited in New York's general revenues. Hospitals keep the 13% differential.
See Brief for Respondents New York Health Maintenance Organization Conference at2, Travelers,
115 S. Ct. 1671 (No. 93-1408).
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York's rate-setting system. In the early twentieth century, private insurance
companies were hesitant to issue indemnity insurance because of concerns such
as actuarially unpredictable claims and moral hazard."' 8 Thus, in the 1930s
and 1940s, the American Hospital Association, along with state and local
hospital groups-sought to assure access to increasingly expensive health care
by creating a prepayment system similar to insurance."° The hospital groups
devised what are known as "service-benefit" plans, i.e., the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans. Health service benefit plans are in essence contracts with
providers, whereby providers agree to provide services to plan subscribers who
pay a premium; Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans are underwritten by hospitals
and physicians-not insurers-and are issued by not-for-profit health services
corporations. "0
When they emerged, service benefit plans served the increasingly
important social function of collective payment of health costs. Thus, in order
to foster the growth of the Blues, federal and state legislators exempted health
service corporations from general insurance laws and from federal taxation on
their income and premiums."' In return, the health services corporations had
to structure their plans according to certain standards. For example, the plans
were required to be open to the whole community through open enrollment
and community rating, and to offer "freedom of choice" to both provider and
subscriber." 2 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were thus able to achieve
important social objectives. An open enrollment policy ensures that persons
with pre-existing health conditions, the elderly, and other more risky persons
will be able to obtain coverage. Community rating renders coverage more
affordable because premiums are based on the overall experience of the
community, rather than a particular subscriber's experience. The Blues also
provided an important economic factor. Blue Cross plans offer prompt payment
to providers and cash advances, thereby providing funds for capital
expenditures. "'
In exchange, and in addition to the exemptions from taxation and
insurance regulations, Blue Cross plans historically received substantial
108. See generally, GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 19 (1990).
109. Sponsors of Blues sought to provide an alternative to government financing, to secure
reimbursement for providers, and to meet the growing public need for collective prepayment. Id.
at 17-20.
110. See MARSHALL RAFFEL AND NORMA RAFFEL, THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM: ORIGINS
AND FUNCTIONS 211-15 (4th ed. 1994).
111. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 108, at 18.
112. Id. That is, any hospital must be allowed the freedom to join the plan and any
subscriber must have the freedom to choose any participating hospital. The plans were also
required to ensure that a majority of the directors of service-benefit plans were representatives
of the hospital industry. Id.
113. Brief for Petitioners Blue Cross & Blue Shield at 11, supra note 106.
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discounts from hospitals.1"4 These discounts, in turn, enabled the Blues to
compete with private insurance companies which emerged in the health market
after observing the success of the Blues. 15 Commercial insurers have always
been more profit-seeking than the Blues. They have never adopted a philosophy
of assuring coverage to an entire community, but instead, seek to avoid
insuring high risk individuals. 1 6 By insuring mostly low risk individuals,
commercial insurers could price their product more competitively. The non-
regulatory, market-initiated hospital discounts to Blues plans helped to offset
the competitive advantage of commercial insurance.
The rate-differentials in New York's rate-setting provisions were designed
to continue the discounts which the Blues received from the hospitals. 7 In
response to a recommendation of the legislatively created Council on Health
Care Financing, the New York legislature incorporated the use of differential
rates, although at a lower level than had been the practice in the
marketplace.1 Finding a continued justification for a differential, the New
York legislature maintained the differential at 13% in rate-setting legislation
in both 1990 and 1993.' For similar reasons, the New York reimbursement
system used the additional 11 % differential from April 1992 through March
1993 due to the increasing use of risk selection by commercial insurers which
resulted in increasingly higher claims costs for the Blues. As the insurers
captured the safer risks in a community, the Blues were left with an
increasingly high risk pool of subscribers. The additional 11% was charged
only for one year because in April of 1993, legislation went into effect that
114. Id.
115. Id. Another significant factor in the emergence of commercial insurers was the
Internal Revenue Services decision in 1943 that employer contributions to group health insurance
were exempt from the employee's taxable income. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 108, at 19.
116. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 108, at 20
117. Notably, New York did not engage in government-initiated rate-setting until 1969,
when the legislature enacted the Hospital Cost Control Law. Brief for Petitioners Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, supra note 106, at 11-12 (citing 1969 N.Y. Laws, ch. 957, 2). Early legislation
regulated only the charges to Medicaid and Blue Cross, for the express purpose of permitting those
payers to continue meeting a legitimate social need. Rate-setting was extended to all payers in
1983. The all-payer reimbursement system was known as the New York Prospective Hospital
Reimbursement Methodology. See id. at 7-13; Brief for Petitioners Hospital Association of New
York State at 3-9, (No. 93-1415).
118. The difference between the lower regulated rates and the rates which hospitals could
charge other payers ranged between 25% and 40%. See Brief for Petitioners Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, supra note 106, at 12-13.
119. The statutory limitation on the differential was initially set between 12% and 15%.
From 1986-1987, the reimbursement system limited the differential to 12%. The legislature
adopted the DRG-based system in 1988, along with the 13% differential. Continued use of a
differential in favor of Blue Cross plans was premised upon (1) prepayment to hospitals by the
Blues, which provides working capital and costs savings to hospitals; and (2) social policy factors
such as the Blue Cross coverage practices which make insurance available and affordable and
which provide indirect financial support to hospitals by averting bad debts. See id.
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required all insurers offering policies to individuals and small groups to do so
on a community rated and open enrollment basis.12°
HMOs are in the same category as Blue Cross & Blue Shield plans.
HMOs also help meet significant economic and social objectives. Although
HMOs have existed since the 1930s, their use did not proliferate until recent
years when, because of the steep increase in costs of health care in the 1980s,
employers and other sponsors of health care sought out alternatives to
traditional indemnity insurance.' 2' Although the differences between
commercial insurance and coverage through HMOs are blurring, HMOs are
not insurers. Rather, HMOs provide or arrange for care through a variety of
contractual arrangements with physicians and other providers, including
institutional providers such as hospitals. 22 The coverage offered through
HMOs is often more comprehensive than that available through commercial
insurers, with an emphasis on primary and preventive care.'23 In addition,
coverage is more affordable. Premiums for HMO coverage are typically below
the cost of commercial insurance, and HMOs require few out-of-pocket
expenses and impose only minimal co-payments or deductibles. 24 HMOs,
like Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, have benefitted from various enabling
provisions. 12 In return, HMOs have often been required to meet certain
obligations, such as the use of open enrollment and community rating policies,
120. The 13% differential was retained, however, because the health insurance reforms
could not redress all of the inequities in the insurance market. Id. at 9 n.8.
121. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 108, at 777. See also HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 19-20 (1990) [hereinafter HIAA
SOURCE BOOK].
122. An HMO is an organization in which the HMO itself and/or participating physicians
accept contractual responsibility to assure the delivery of a stated set of health care services,
including ambulatory and in-hospital care to a voluntarily enrolled population in exchange for an
advance capitation payment; the HMO assumes at least part of the financial risk and/or share in
the surplus. Randall Boubjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary
Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1376 n. 1 (1976) (quoting HEALTH SERVICES INFORMATION, Oct.
20, 1975, at 2).
123. See Gayle L. Holland, HMOs Member Physicians Assuming the Risk of Loss Under
State and Federal Bankruptcy Laws, 15 J. LEG. MED. 445, 446-51 (1994) (in return for a fixed
fee, the HMO provides unlimited health care). See also HIAA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 121 at
33, Table 2.17.
124. For example, in 1989, the average monthly premium for coverage under a
conventional insurance policy was $119 for an individual and $268 for family coverage. HIAA
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 121 at 16. In contrast, HMO coverage cost $108 per month for an
individual, and $272 for a family. Id.
125. E.g., the Federal HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1988), was enacted to
encourage the development of HMOs. The Act authorized grants and subsidized loans to meet
start-up costs, and ensured access to consumers.
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as well as maintenance of quality of care. 26
HMOs are distinct from the Blues in that they are often more profit
oriented. 27 HMOs are providers of care and, like other providers, many are
for-profit. Like many for-profit entities, HMOs may resist contracting with
purchasers whose ability to pay premiums may be restricted. The 9%
assessment that may be imposed on HMOs under New York's rate-setting
scheme therefore also promotes the important health policy objective of shifting
the Medicaid population to managed care through HMOs.
For instance, in order to contain costs many states are striving to provide
health care to Medicaid recipients through managed care organizations such
as HMOs. New York established a managed care program for its Medicaid
population in 1991.12' The state as a payer of Medicaid is within category
one and hospitals may charge only the DRG rate when providing services to
Medicaid recipients. Because hospital charges are limited, HMOs that provide
hospital services may try to limit the number of enrollees that are Medicaid
patients.129 Yet states have an obligation under federal regulations to assure
that Medicaid patients have access to health care services. 30 Accordingly,
access to care for Medicaid recipients through HMOs can be enhanced by
requiring hospitals to charge the 9% assessment when the payer is an HMO
which has failed to enroll the target number of Medicaid patients.
The United Wire case involved a similar rate-setting scheme premised
upon the DRG methodology. 3' New Jersey adopted its prospective DRG-
126. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN § 641.3102 (West 1995 Supp.) (prohibiting terminations
of coverage on the basis of age, health status, or health care needs); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.31(2)
(West 1995 Supp.) (prohibiting unfairly discriminatory rates); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.51 (West
1995 Supp.) (requiring on-going internal quality assurance program).
127. Notably, however, the Blues have begun to shift to a proprietary organizational
structure as well. See, e.g., Insurance: Georgia Blues to Convert to Public For-Profit Insurer,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Nov. 8, 1995, at d15 ("Like many Blues across the country, Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Georgia wanted to make the change to be able to compete against the rapidly
growing managed care networks.").
128. See Brief for Respondents New York Health Maintenance Organization Confer6nce,
supra note 107 at 1-3.
129. Further, to survive, hospitals must able to engage in cost-shifting: i.e., they must
be able to shift the cost of caring for patients that cannot pay the hospital in full onto patients with
private commercial insurance. On the other hand, hospitals do not mind keeping some Medicaid
patients because the regular payments coming in from the state helps pay for some of the hospitals'
variable costs. Eugene A. Gotbeck, Remarks at the 16th Annual Health Law Teachers Conference
at Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr. (June 1995).
130. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13)(A) (state Medicaid plans must provide for payment
through rates which are reasonable and adequate in order to ensure that care conforms with
requirements and that eligible individuals have reasonable access).
131. Interestingly, by the time of the decision, new legislation had superseded certain
aspects of the contested rate-setting scheme. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-4.1 (West 1995 Supp.)
(enacted 1993).
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based system in 1978.132 The dual purpose of the rate-setting system was to
contain the rising costs of health care services and to ensure the financial
solvency of hospitals.' 33 As with the New York scheme, the DRG rate
constituted the base rate to which other charges were added.3 4 First, a
statewide charge was added to the basic DRG-rate of all patients in order to
generate revenue for redistribution to hospitals in proportion to uncompensated
care provided to indigent patients.' 35 A second charge could then be added
to the hospital bill of non-Medicare patients to compensate hospitals for losses
incurred through treatment of Medicare patients. '36
The New Jersey system also utilized rate differentials. The regulatory
scheme permitted the Commission to grant reimbursements to certain classes
of payers based upon "quantifiable economic benefits" rendered to particular
institutions or to the health care delivery system as a whole.' 7 These benefits
included, for example, benefits to a hospital such as ready capital generated
by promptness and volume of payments to hospitals, or benefits to society such
as broad provision of health insurance coverages which are not self-
supporting. 3 The Commission had therefore granted a 2.2% discount to
high-volume plans and an 11% discount to plans with open enrollments, such
as Blue Cross.'39 Moreover, patients who did not belong to plans that
received the discounts could be billed at an increased rate to allow hospitals
to recover income lost through the discount."
Both of these rate-setting systems affect ERISA plans to the extent that
the payer with which a plan contracts becomes a key determinant of the costs
that the plan will incur. Commercial insurers and HMOs that provide coverage
for insured ERISA plans are directly affected by the increased rates specified
by the laws. However, these entities pass the costs along to their customers
in the form of higher premiums or subscription fees. Thus, a plan that provides
coverage to employees through a Blue Cross plan will likely be subject to
lower premiums than a plan that provides coverage through a commercial
132. See also United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189 (citing New Jersey Health Care Facilities
Planning Act of 1971, as amended by the Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 1978, N.J. STAT
ANN. § 26:2H-1, et seq. (West 1987); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 31B et seq.).
133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-1 (West 1987).
134. United Wire, 995 F.2d 1179, 1189 (3d Cir. 1993).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-18(b) (repealed 1992) (West 1995 Supp.).
138. Id.
139. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1190.
140. Id. The impact on ERISA plans was elevated even more by an "equitable ride-over
provision" that permitted uninsured individual payers to appeal the increased bills and to obtain
a reduction when equitable. Id. n.1 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 31B-3.78(a)(viii)). A
reduction obtained through such an appeal did not result in another charge being added to the bill
of paying patients.
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insurer; and ERISA plans that insure with commercial insurers would likely
face higher premiums. These factors could influence an employer's choices
about which type of payer to contract with to provide health care benefits. The
impact on self-insured plans may be more immediate because the claims are
more directly absorbed by a, fund or trust supporting the employees'
coverage.14' Employers who choose to self-insure are in the same category
as commercial insurers in the New York system if plan payments are paid
directly to hospitals and would not receive discounts under the New Jersey
system unless the employer maintained open enrollment policies. Because self-
insured ERISA plans would not fall within a group benefitting from the
differentials, they would be required to pay higher hospital bills. Though more
direct, the impact is still purely economic. Whether the hospital rate-setting
schemes at issue were pre-empted by ERISA, hinged on whether this economic
impact created a sufficient relation to ERISA plans.
2. The Split in the Circuits
In the United Wire case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
ERISA did not pre-empt New Jersey's rate-setting system.'42 The Third
Circuit recognized that the increased costs from the surcharges would be
passed along to the plans. However, the court found this impact to be
indistinguishable from that of a multitude of other regulation that increases the
costs of goods or services purchased by hospitals, such as utility costs, waste
disposal costs, or wages, etc.'43 As with any supplier of goods in our market
economy, the costs of such regulations are typically passed on to the consumer.
Further, since rates for hospital services vary -from region to region
notwithstanding state rate-setting, the court found the impact on the
administration of multi-state plans to be negligible.'" Moreover, the court
held that the rate-setting scheme does "not direct ERISA plans to structure
their benefits or conduct their internal affairs in any particular way.""' The
court thus held that the scheme did not "relate to" employee benefit plans. 46
141. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
142. United Wire, 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
143. Id. at 1193.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The court also rejected the plans' arguments that the surcharges were impermissibly
requiring them to act in a manner inconsistent with a fiduciary obligation under ERISA to apply
fund assets only for the benefit of fund participants. The court noted that Congress surely did not
intend that ERISA plans must "look through" to the pricing structure of every health care provider
to assure that the price of services correlates directly with the costs of services: "We are unwilling
to attribute to Congress . . .an intent to frustrate the efforts of a state, under its police power,
to regulate health care costs." Id. at 1195-96.
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There was a strong dissenting opinion, however. 147 The dissent noted
that New Jersey was well aware of the pivotal role that ERISA plans would
play, and the presence of specific references to union welfare plans, in the
rate-setting scheme. 148 Further, the dissent pointed out the enormous financial
impact of the surcharges on ERISA plans: "ERISA plan participants comprise
only about 15% of the hospital patients, but pay about 40% of the more than
$1.1 billion shortfall generated by the state-mandated cost shifts. "149
According to the dissent, the surcharges were not comparable to other indirect
increases associated with the cost of providing hospital services; rather, "[t] hey
are the direct cost of hospital services rendered to other patients, which have
been shifted to ERISA plans."15 The regulations should thus have been held
pre-empted because they have interfered with the operation of ERISA plans
to the point where the plans have suffered large financial losses."'
The Second Circuit in Travelers agreed with the dissenting opinion in
United Wire and held that the New York provisions satisfied the "connection
with" requirement for pre-emption.2' The court stated that the 13% and 1 1%
differentials would "obviously" affect the ERISA plans' health care benefits;
and that the 9% assessment would interfere with the choices that ERISA plans
make for health care coverage. 53 According to the court, the district court
"properly found that the three surcharges 'relate to' ERISA because they
impose a significant economic burden on commercial insurers and
HMOs."154
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Travelers as to the proper scope
of the phrase "relate to" provided an opportunity to bring uniformity and
predictability to a multitude of potential decisions. Given the ever-broadening
trend of lower courts to find health reform legislation pre-empted, as well as
the fact that health reform has moved from the national arena back to the
states, the time was ripe for the Supreme Court to articulate more clearly the
outer bounds of ERISA pre-emption, thereby restraining lower courts from
extending pre-emption beyond the scope of what Congress could have intended
in 1974.
147. Id. at 1196 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1198.
149. Id. at 1199-1200.
150. Id. at 1202-03.
151. Id. at 1203.
152. 14 F.3d 708, 721 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993).
153. Id. at 719.
154. Id. at 721.
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II. The Supreme Court Decision in Travelers
A. An Indirect Economic Impact Is Not a Regulation of an ERISA Plan
The Supreme Court specifically limited the issue before it to the question
whether ERISA pre-empted New York's rate-setting legislation when applied
to insured ERISA plans or ERISA plans utilizing HMOs, thereby excluding
consideration of its application to self-insured ERISA plans.155 The Court
also recognized that the real issue was whether an indirect economic effect on
ERISA plans sufficed to meet the "relate to" requirement of ERISA's pre-
emption clause.'56 In contrast to the district court and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the rate-setting legislation did
not "relate to" ERISA plans within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption
provision. "'
The Court began its analysis of pre-emption by stressing what lower
courts had increasingly overlooked-that the resolution of pre-emption claims
is premised on a presumption against pre-emption, especially in cases where
federal law would be supplanting state action in a field of traditional state
regulation such as health care.'58 Further, the Court reiterated that the
question of pre-emption depends on Congress's intent.159 Following
traditional pre-emption analysis, the Court first examined the key
language-the phrase "relate to." Notably, the Court more clearly indicated
that ERISA's express pre-emption provision is not a reliable indicium of
congressional intent. The Court stated that, "[i]f 'relate to' were taken to
155. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1673-74 ("This case calls for us to decide whether [ERISA]
pre-empts the state provisions for surcharges on bills of patients whose commercial insurance
coverage is purchased by employee health-care plans governed by ERISA, and for surcharges on
HMOs insofar as their membership fees are paid by an ERISA plan.") (citations omitted); see also
id. at 1675 n.4 ("Nor do we address the surcharge statute insofar as it applies to self-insured
funds."). This limitation is interesting given the fact that Travelers Insurance was a party to the
suit in its capacity as a fiduciary for self-insured ERISA plans. See Id. In United Wire, the
plaintiffs were self-insured ERISA plans as well. However, neither appellate opinion expressly
addressed whether the status of insured versus self-insured would make a difference in the pre-
emption analysis. Both courts framed the issue in the cases more generally as whether the hospital
rate-setting systems-which had existed for years and which were enacted to achieve important
health policy objectives-had an effect upon insured ERISA plans that was sufficient to render
the laws pre-empted. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1188.
156. The Court highlighted the fact that both the district court and the Second Circuit held
that the state law impermissibly related to ERISA plans because the effect on commercial insurers
ard HMOs, which would or could provide coverage to ERISA plans, could indirectly lead to an
increase in plan costs and thereby effect choices made by ERISA plans. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at
1675-76 (citing 813 F. Supp. 996, 1003-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 14 F.3d 708, 719-21 (2d Cir.
1993)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1676 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
159. Id. at 1677.
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extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical
purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for '[r]eally, universally,
relations stop nowhere.'"' 60 The Court also found its prior articulation of
the meaning of the phrase, as encompassing laws that have "a connection with
or reference to" an ERISA plan, to be unhelpful in this case. The state law
did not reference ERISA plans, and "[for] the same reasons that infinite
relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption, neither can infinite
connections. "161
Thus, the Court appropriately used an implied pre-emption analysis and
looked to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide for congressional
intent as to the scope of the phrase "relate to."162 The Court reiterated the
legislative history that it had looked to in prior cases, and found that the "basic
thrust of the pre-emption clause was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans.'163 The Court reviewed some of its prior holdings where it had found
that a state law "related to" ERISA plans, and concluded that the pre-empted
state laws either mandated employee benefit structures or administrative
practices of plans, or provided alternative enforcement mechanisms within the
scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions."
The Court then found that both the purpose and effects of the New York
rate-setting provisions distinguished them from laws within the scope of the
pre-emption provision.' The Court noted that the effect on ERISA plans
flows from the purpose underlying the rate-setting provisions-the additional
charges imposed on patients of commercial insurers and HMOs make coverage
through Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans more attractive and thus have an
indirect economic effect on the choices made by purchasers of health coverage
such as ERISA plans.'66 The crux of the opinion is the Court's determination
that:
160. Id. (quoting H. JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON xli (New York ed., World's Classics
1980)).
161. Id.
162. Id. The Court, therefore, implicitly found that the phrase "relate to" is not a reliable
indicium of congressional intent. Id.
163. Id. at 1677-78.
164. Id. at 1678 ("In each of these cases [in which the Court found that a state law 'related
to' ERISA plans] ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated employee benefit structures or their
administration. Elsewhere, we have held that state laws providing alternative enforcement
mechanisms also relate to ERISA plans, triggering pre-emption.") (citations omitted). This
categorization is in accord with the analysis in section I.A. of this article. Presumably, the Court
did not include the category of laws that specifically apply to ERISA plans or impose a duty on
a plan by referencing ERISA plans because it had already noted that this case did not involve a
state law that referenced ERISA plans in any manner.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1678-79.
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An indirect economic influence, however, does not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself . . . Nor does the indirect
influence . . . preclude uniform administrative practices or the
provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wishes
to provide one. It simply bears on the costs of benefits and the
relative costs of competing insurance to provide them. It is an
influence that can affect a plan's shopping decisions, but it does not
affect the fact that any plan will shop for the best deal it can get,
surcharges or no surcharges. 167
The Court bolstered its determination by noting that rate-differentials had
been in existence for many years and in many contexts, even absent state
regulation. This "common character" of rate-differentials rendered it unlikely
that Congress intended to pre-empt such an indirect economic influence. 161
Moreover, the Court noted the existence of many other common state
regulations that result in a similar indirect economic effect on ERISA plans
by virtue of affecting the cost and price of services offered to ERISA plans,
such as regulation of quality of care or employment conditions .169 Although
the other regulations would be less likely -to affect premium differentials
between commercial insurers, HMOs and the Blues, the Court concluded that
it could not find the additional charges to be pre-empted unless the other
regulations with indirect effects on plan costs would be pre-empted as
well: 70 "The bigger the package of regulation with indirect effects . . . .
the less likely it is that federal regulation of benefit plans was intended to
eliminate state regulation of health care costs."171
Importantly, the Court noted that to hold all state laws affecting costs and
charges to be pre-empted on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA
plans could not be squared with its prior pronouncements that pre-emption is
inappropriate if the state law has only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral
connection with covered plans. The Court noted that "nothing in the language
of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress chose to
displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a matter
of local concern."' 72 The Court found that its decision in Mackey supported
its holding that the rate-setting provisions were not pre-empted.'73 In Mackey,





172. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985) and 1 B. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 1-6, 1-23 (1995)).
173. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
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the Court held that a state garnishment proceeding did not relate to ERISA
plans even though it placed administrative burdens upon ERISA plans. 74 "If
a law authorizing an indirect source of administrative cost is not pre-empted,
it should follow that a law operating as an indirect source of merely economic
influence on administrative decisions . . . should not suffice to trigger pre-
emption either."175
Further, the Court readily distinguished Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Massachusetts.76 Travelers Insurance had argued that Metropolitan Life
supported the proposition that "all laws affecting ERISA plans through their
impact on insurance policies 'relate to' such plans . .. " 177 The Court noted
that the law in Metropolitan Life imposed a substantive coverage requirement
on ERISA plans, 7 s and thus the case did not require the Court to
"distinguish with any precision the effects on insurers that are sufficiently
connected with employee benefit plans to 'relate to' and those effects that are
not."' Indeed, the Court explained that Metropolitan Life implicitly
recognized that not all laws that would influence the cost of insurance relate
to ERISA plans.' The Court pointed out that, if the scope of the phrase
"relate to" was that broad, even the basic tax breaks enjoyed by non-profit
insurers such as the Blues would be pre-empted because of the impact on
insurance prices and plan costs."'
Finally, the Court explored what many believed was the fundamental
factor in this case: that a finding of pre-emption would bar any state regulation
of hospital costs-even use of a basic DRG-rate without any differential
treatment among payers."8 2 It is difficult to attribute this result to
congressional intent given the fact that rate-setting was in existence when
ERISA was enacted and was actually encouraged by the federal government.
Several states, including New York, regulated hospital rates in 1974, the year
ERISA was passed. Moreover, the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 prescribed grant opportunities for state agencies to,
among other things, demonstrate the effectiveness of health care rate
174. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
175. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
176. Id. (citing 471 U.S. 724 (1985)).
177. Id.
178. That is, the law required ERISA plans to purchase specified benefits when they
purchased certain types of insurance. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
179. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680-81.
180. Id. at 1681 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 741 ("[L]aws that regulate only
the insurer, or the way in which it may sell insurance, do not 'relate to' benefit plans ... .
181. Id.
182. Id. The DRG methodology inevitably impacts insurance prices, and thus would
indirectly have an economic effect on ERISA plans. Notably, that effect may be positive. If
hospitals are limited in the amount they may charge, cost of coverage could decrease.
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regulation. I"3 Accordingly, the Court stated that the "provision for
comprehensive aid to state health care rate regulation is simply incompatible
with pre-emption of the same by ERISA."'"
Thus, New York's rate-setting provisions as applied to insured ERISA
plans or plans utilizing HMOs were saved from ERISA pre-emption. An
economic effect that at most only influences decisions concerning benefit
structure or administrative schemes is not sufficient for pre-emption. The Court
limited its holding, however. The Court noted that a "state law might produce
such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent'or otherwise, as to force
an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively
restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be pre-
empted under § 514."' s For example, the Court noted that "there might be
a point at which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson's choice
would be treated as imposing a substantive mandate."'s6
B. Analysis: A Signal for a More Restrained Application of ERISA Pre-
emption?
Although the Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the split in the
courts of appeal, the Court's fundamental reason for hearing the case was to
provide more definitive guidance to courts which must identify the line
delimiting state laws that Congress intended ERISA to pre-empt. At first blush
the holding appears to be narrowly limited. In reality, the opinion sheds
substantial light on the proper pre-emption analysis.
First, the case can be construed as an articulation of a tighter standard
for determining pre-emption in that category of cases where the state law
affects the benefit structure or administrative practices of an ERISA plan." 7
On a narrow view, the case stands for the proposition that state laws that
merely have an indirect, economic effect which may influence an employer's
decisions regarding what insurer to deal with, what benefits to offer, the level
of benefits, or even how benefits are calculated, do not "relate to" ERISA
plans within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption provision-unless the
influence is so strong that plans have no real choice at all. New York's rate-
setting provisions, as applied to insured plans or plans utilizing HMOs, only
influence the employer's choice as to whether to provide coverage through
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, and thus were not pre-empted.
183. Id. at 1681-82.
184. Id. at 1682.
185. Id. at 1683.
186. Id. at 1681.
187. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text for an explanation of the three
categories of state laws that have generally been found to be pre-empted.
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Viewed more broadly, however, the principle of Travelers could apply
beyond laws with an economic effect. This construdtion is sound because of
the Court's approach to the resolution of the issue. The Court first took a fairly
narrow view of its prior ERISA pre-emption cases. The Court concluded that,
in addition to laws that specifically regulate ERISA plans or laws that are
within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, the laws previously
found to be pre-empted "mandated" either employee benefit structures or
administrative practices.'88 The Court then determined whether an economic
effect created a sufficient connection to ERISA plans by measuring the effect
of the rate-setting provision against that standard, i.e., whether the rate-setting
scheme "bound" administrators' or employers' decisions regarding benefit
structures or administrative practices.189 The principle of Travelers does not
therefore need to be limited to cases involving only economic effects. Rather,
the principle could apply to any pre-emption challenge to a state law that has
an effect on benefit structures or administrative practices. '90 The pre-emption
question thus hinges on whether the effect of the law actually or practically
binds choices as to benefit packages or structures or administrative practices.
Lower courts often stated that it was sufficient if the law had "any"
effect-which would include a mere influential effect.' 9 Thus, Travelers
pronounced a tighter standard than that used by many lower courts.
Second, the Court indicated that both the purpose and the effect of a state
law are relevant to the pre-emption issue.' 92 The purpose and effect of New
York's rate-setting legislation distinguished it from laws previously found to
be within the scope of the "relate to" provision. Yet the effect of a law upon
ERISA plans is clearly the more weighty determinant. As noted, the Court's
analysis focused on the effect of the state law on ERISA plans. In relevant
prior cases, the effect of the state laws at issue was to mandate employee
benefit structures or administrative practices of ERISA plans. The effect of
New York's rate-setting provision did not bind administrators' choices
188. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
189. Id. at 1679-80.
190. An argument could be made that this reading of Travelers is too broad because there
is still a distinction between claims that have an effect on ERISA plans. An intermediate position
would be to distinguish laws more readily characterized as involving the administration of the
ERISA plan. In such a case, that law probably has an economic impact on the plan, but as well
has some bearing on plan administration other than the mere passing through of costs. Thus, an
argument could be made that pre-emption would be appropriate if the law somehow implicates
core ERISA concerns-even if the effect does not bind administrative functions. However, the
Court in Travelers characterized the prior laws that had been pre-empted as having "mandated"
administrative practices, and gave no indication of leaving the door open for intermediate
situations. It is therefore reasonable and sensible to construe the opinion in this manner.
191. See, e.g., Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding vicarious
liability claims against HMOs pre-empted because of "trickle down" cost to plan beneficiaries).
192. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
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regarding benefit structures or administrative practices. This distinguishable
effect was clearly central to the Court's holding. 93
The purpose of a state law, however, is also relevant to the pre-emption
question. The Court noted the justifications for the rate-differentials-that the
Blues reimburse hospitals promptly and utilize open-enrollment practices-but
did not expressly note the purpose of the rate-setting scheme. The purpose was
to help ensure the continued viability of plans such as Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans and HMOs, whose underwriting practices provide access to
coverage for higher risk individuals.'94 This "health policy" objective is
clearly distinguishable from the purpose underlying the laws at issue in prior
Supreme Court cases. In all prior cases, except those which involved causes
of action within the scope of ERISA's enforcement provision, the purpose
underlying the state laws was, generally, to either assure certain benefits or
benefit levels to individuals.'95 Because the Court did not specifically address
the difference in purpose, it is unclear whether a state law that is grounded in
health policy may escape pre-emption on that basis alone. However, analysis
of Supreme Court precedent suggests not. In Greater Washington Board of
Trade, the state law was arguably designed to address the growing problem
of uninsurance by ensuring that persons receiving workers' compensation
would still receive their health care benefits. 96 Yet the Court held that the
law related to ERISA plans because it imposed a mandate upon employers
relating to benefit structure by specific reference to ERISA plans."' Thus,
a better interpretation of the Travelers opinion may be that the purpose of the
state law is relevant to the pre-emption issue to the extent that the purpose
reflects a legislative intent to regulate within the scope of traditional state
regulations, e.g., health care regulations. The Court in Travelers reiterated the
importance of the presumption against pre-emption and, in analyzing the issue,
found nothing in the language or legislative history of ERISA which indicated
an intent to pre-empt general health care regulations. ' The purpose of a law
therefore helps a court determine whether the law should be accorded the more
weighty presumption against pre-emption.
Third, the Court implicitly discounted the relevancy of the fact that the
rate-differentials had a disparate impact on ERISA plans, and, indeed, that the
state may have understood that the scheme could not accomplish its purpose
without a disparate effect on ERISA plans. That is, because a clear majority
of health insurance coverage is through ERISA plans, ERISA plans pay a
193. Id. at 1680.
194. See supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1681.
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significant percentage of the higher charges; and so without ERISA plans the
system of differentials would not have accomplished its underlying purpose.
The parties argued this point before the Court, and the Second Circuit
expressly relied upon it."9" Yet this factor did not enter into the Court's
analysis. Thus, the fact that an indirect economic effect falls primarily upon
ERISA plans or that the underlying objective of the state law could not be
achieved without the disparate impact on ERISA plans does not support a
finding of pre-emption.
Fourth, the Court provided additional guidance to help courts determine
congressional intent, the touchstone of any pre-emption analysis. Because the
text of ERISA's pre-emption provision provides an unreliable indicium of
Congress's intent, the Court clearly indicated that courts should engage in an
implied pre-emption analysis. Further, the opinion strongly suggests that the
implied pre-emption analysis should incorporate the following premises.
Foremost, there is a strong presumption against pre-emption, especially for
laws such as health care regulations that are within the traditional police power
of the states.2°" Additionally, as previously noted in Fort Halifax, a finding
of pre-emption should serve a fundamental objective of the ERISA statute,
namely to avoid state laws that would interfere with nationally uniform
administration of ERISA plans by leaving with employers control over
decisions regarding the scope of coverage and the design of key administrative
practices.2"' However, rather than using language that could suggest that
Congress intended to reach state laws that merely "interfered" with uniform
administrative practices, the Court stressed a narrower view of the underlying
objective of ERISA. Mere interference is not sufficient; a state law must bind
choices as to administrative practices.20 2
Moreover, the opinion suggests that courts should adopt the pragmatic
approach demonstrated in Fort Halifax and Mackey. The Court indicated that
it is not appropriate to pre-empt state laws with an effect analogous to that of
"common" state laws, especially if such laws have been encouraged by the
federal government.2 3 The rationale for this limitation is twofold. First, it
199. See Brief for Respondents The Travelers Insurance Co. et al. at 16, Travelers, 115
S.Ct. 1671 (1995) (No. 93-1408) ("ERISA plans comprise the overwhelming majority of the
customers of health care benefit payors in New York").
200. Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1681.
201. Id. at 1677-78.
202. The Court expressly stated that cost uniformity is not an object of pre-emption. Id.
at 1680. And perhaps more importantly, the Court took a narrow view of what constitutes
impermissible interference with uniform administration. The Court's findings in Travelers indicate
that mere "interference" is not sufficient; rather, to constitute a pre-empted "regulation" of ERISA
plans, the state law must bind employers or administrators by mandating benefit structures or
administrative practices. The Court ignored the language in dicta in prior opinions which arguably
would have supported a broader view of ERISA pre-emption. Id. at 1681-82.
203. Id. at 1679, 1681-82.
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is difficult to reach a meritorious conclusion that Congress could have intended
to pre-empt state laws within the traditional domain of state power when the
effect of the law on core ERISA concerns is slight and where Congress has
in some way endorsed the state law. 2" Second, and more informative, the
Court implicitly indicated that it is important to be able to identify a logical
stopping point to pre-emption. The Court expressed the concern that, if the
rate-setting provisions were deemed pre-empted because of their indirect
economic effect, than courts would logically have to find that other
regulations-such as quality control and workplace regulations-were pre-
empted even though they might be "less likely to affect premium
differentials. 205 Yet the Court stressed that the bigger the field of traditional
state laws that would logically fall within the scope of pre-emption, the more
difficult it is to conclude that Congress intended that result.206 Thus, in
assessing congressional intent, courts should balance the promotion of ERISA
objectives with the practical consequences of a finding of pre-emption.
In sum, the opinion provides much needed guidance for courts asked to
identify the line delimiting state laws that Congress intended to pre-empt, and
suggests that fewer state laws should be pre-empted. The opinion could be
construed narrowly as being applicable only to cases involving an indirect
economic effect. However, it is equally meritorious to interpret the opinion
more broadly, as a strong signal that the scope of ERISA pre-emption should
generally be restrained. The approach used by the Court can be construed as
suggesting, a framework for ERISA pre-emption that restores deference to
traditional state regulations and implements a tighter standard for assessing
whether the effect of a state law impermissibly infringes on core ERISA
concerns. Further, the Court's emphasis on the need for logical lines of
delimitation suggests that in difficult cases courts must carefully scrutinize
Supreme Court precedent as well as details relevant to the case.
Harmonizing the principles from Travelers with Supreme Court precedent
arguably results in a more pragmatic and delineated framework for analyzing
questions of ERISA pre-emption. A court must first assess whether the state
law being challenged as pre-empted is a law within the traditional police power
of the states, such as health care regulation. The underlying purpose of the law
is relevant to this inquiry. That the state may have known that the effect of the
law would fall largely on ERISA plans is not a determinative factor. If the law
is within an area traditionally of local concern then there should be no pre-
emption absent clear congressional intent.
Travelers made clear that the structure of ERISA as a whole and its pre-
204. Id. at 1680.
205. Id. at 1679.
206. Id.
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emption provisions indicate that laws that may "relate to" to ERISA plans fall
into three categories. Thus, the next step in the pre-emption analysis is to
identify whether the state law (1) was designed specifically to apply to ERISA
plans or imposes a benefit-related duty on employers or administrators by
express reference to ERISA plans; (2) is a common law action within the scope
of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions and represents an alternative
enforcement mechanism; or (3) relates to ERISA plans because of its effect
on employer or administrator decisions concerning benefit structure or
administration of the plan. If the state law falls within categories (1) or (2),
the Supreme Court cases indicate that the law should generally be pre-empted.
Travelers provides little specific guidance for the scope of ERISA pre-emption
as to laws in these categories. As to laws that fall within category (3), a court
should apply the standard used in Travelers: i.e., pre-emption depends on
whether the effect of the law binds employers or administrators to particular
choices as to, or precludes use of, uniform benefit structures or administrative
practices.
Further, in applying the standard from Travelers to any state law, the
Court indicated that courts must keep in mind the core congressional concerns
underlying the pre-emption provision. If pre-emption will not further key
ERISA objectives, than it is difficult to conclude that Congress clearly intended
to pre-empt common state laws. Moreover, because of the Court's emphasis
on the need for logical lines of delimitation, courts must carefully scrutinize
Supreme Court precedent and flesh out factual distinctions relevant to the case
at hand to achieve a pragmatic assessment of congressional intent to pre-empt
the state laws at issue.
The following section applies this framework to a variety of state laws
currently being challenged in the lower courts. The inconsistencies in the lower
courts on the issue of pre-emption illustrate that many in the judiciary do not
believe that Congress intended ERISA pre-emption to be as broad as some
courts are finding. The issue thus becomes whether the analytical framework
that can be derived from Travelers can effectively restrain findings of ERISA
pre-emption and restore uniformity and predictability to the question of ERISA
pre-emption.
III. Application to Emerging Pre-emption Issues
A. Provider Taxes or Other Surcharges that Affect ERISA Plans that
Contract for Health Care Coverage
The clearest principle emerging from Travelers is that state laws that have
an indirect, economic effect on decisions regarding benefit structures or
administrative practices for plans that contract for health care coverage do not
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"relate to" ERISA plans within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption
provision-unless the influence is so strong that, practically speaking,
employers or administrators have no choice. Thus, cases that involve state laws
that impose taxes or surcharges which only have an indirect economic effect
on insured ERISA plans become easy cases and the inconsistency in lower
court applications to analogous provisions emerging in many state reform
proposals should be resolved.
For example, before Travelers, courts reached different conclusions on
the issue of whether surcharges such as provider taxes imposed on hospitals
were pre-empted by ERISA. In New England Health Care Employees Union
District 1199 v. Mount Sinai Hospital,2 7 the district court held that
Connecticut's Uncompensated Care Pool Act was pre-empted by ERISA. The
Connecticut law at issue was designed to compensate hospitals for the cost of
providing care to those unable to pay for services, namely, the indigent,
uninsured and underinsured.0 8 This type of provision has recently been
enacted in many states. 2" In addition to assessments and taxes on hospital
services and charges similar to those in Travelers, the pool was funded by an
assessment on all hospitals, i.e., a provider tax.210 The federal district court
held that the law related to ERISA plans for two primary reasons: (1) the law
contemplated the existence of ERISA plans and depended on their participation
for its effectiveness;21 and (2) the law imposed a substantial economic
burden on ERISA plans and plans would either increase costs or reduce
benefits. 12
In contrast, in Boyle v. Anderson,2t3 the district court held that a 2%
provider tax included in the Minnesota Health Right Act was not pre-empted.
In resolving the issue, the court used a seven-factor test articulated by the
207. 846 F. Supp. 190 (D. Conn. 1994), rev'd, 65 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) (overruled
after Travelers ) [hereinafter New England Health Care].
208. This is generally termed "uncompensated care." Legislatures have recently begun
trying to assure adequate compensation to hospitals which routinely provide a disproportionate
amount of uncompensated care, e.g., public hospitals and not-for-profit hospitals.
209. States use disproportionate share payments as a means to increase federal Medicaid
matching funds. In Connecticut, the state qualified for approximately $150 million in federal funds,
which it then used to help balance the state budget rather than for its Medicaid program.
210. See 846 F. Supp. at 192 (citing 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-229, §§ 8, 10 (the
assessment "shall be a uniform per cent of the charges for patient care services except those
rendered to patients whose services are covered by Medicare, [Medicaid] and CHAMPUS.")).
211. Id. at 195 (ERISA plans pay 70% of the assessments which fall on privately insured
patients under the Act; without ERISA plans the Act would not be economically viable).
212. Id. at 196-97 (applying the Second Circuit's opinion in Travelers). See also
Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. Pogue, 870 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding that the
amendments to the Connecticut law at issue in New England Health Care-which retained a tax
on patient care services, imposed a gross earnings tax, and authorized shifting costs of
uncompensated care to private pay patients-were pre-empted for similar reasons).
213. 849 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Minn. 1994).
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Eighth Circuit214 and thus several justifications supported its holding. Two
reasons are most relevant to this article. First, the court found that the tax did
not impose a significant burden on or create conflicting burdens for ERISA
plans since the hospital would simply pass-through the charge as a part of the
hospital bill.215 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the court applied the
Second Circuit's holding in Travelers, but held that the indirect economic
effect on ERISA plans in this case was not sufficiently substantial to warrant
216pre-emption.
Application of the Supreme Court's holding in Travelers readily leads to
the conclusion that provider taxes and analogous state laws should not be found
pre-empted. Although surcharges and provider taxes are emerging in various
forms in state health reform proposals, and thus may differ in some respects
from the surcharges in Travelers, practically, the laws are substantially
analogous: such provisions result in increased charges being passed along first
to payers with whom employers have contracted, and then to insured ERISA
plans in the form of increased premiums or subscription fees. While this effect
could influence benefit structures because of increased costs, the laws do not
bind benefit-related decision-making. Accordingly, in light of Travelers, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in New England Health
Care, holding that the law's indirect economic effect on ERISA plans generally
will not trigger ERISA pre-emption.217
More importantly, the analysis for pre-emption after Travelers is
differently focused from the approaches taken by the district courts in these
cases. In New England Health Care, the district court was influenced by the
fact that the law had a disparate impact on ERISA plans. That is, because a
clear majority of health insurance coverage is through ERISA plans, ERISA
plans provided 70% of the funding for the Act; thus, without ERISA plans the
Act would not have been economically viable.21 The court found that this
constituted a sufficient connection with ERISA plans.219 Yet Travelers
indicates that this fact-which is an inevitable consequence of any surcharge
because of the health insurance market-is not significant to the pre-emption
issue."
214. See id. at 1312 (citing Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc.,
947 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1991)).
215. Id. at 1315.
216. Id. at 1315-16.
217. See New England Health Care, 65 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995). See also The Conn.
Hosp. Ass'n v. Weltman, 1995 WL 540407 (2d Cir., Sept. 12, 1995) (similarly overruling a
finding that ERISA pre-empted amendments to the Connecticut law which retained the relevant
provisions regarding provider surcharges).
218. 846 F. Supp. at 195.
219. Id. at 196.
220. The Second Circuit construed Travelers as "implicitly [rejecting] a market
share/dependence approach to ERISA preemption." New England Health Care, 65 F.3d at 1033.
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Similarly, the Court in Travelers implicitly rejected use of the seven-
factor approach used by the court in Boyle. These seven factors were whether
the state law: (1) negates a provision of an ERISA plan; (2) affects relations
between primary ERISA entities; (3) has an impact on the structure of ERISA
plans; (4) has an impact on the administration of the plan; (5) has an economic
impact on ERISA plans; (6) is an exercise of traditional state power; and (7)
whether pre-emption of the state law is consistent with other ERISA
provisions.221
Travelers readily suggests that use of these factors renders the scope of
pre-emption broader than Congress could have intended. First, when the Eighth
Circuit compiled the list of factors from other lower court opinions, the court
discounted factor six. 222 The court in Boyle therefore did not rely on the fact
that the Minnesota law was a health care regulation, and thus an exercise of
traditional state power, in finding that the law was not pre-empted.22a
Travelers expressly rejected this approach by clarifying that, while all state
laws are entitled to a presumption against pre-emption, laws within traditional
state power-and specifically health care regulations-should be accorded
greater deference in the ERISA pre-emption analysis. Second, factors three,
four and five each suggest that any economic impact-or even any non-
economic impact-on the structure or the administration of the plan is
sufficient. Travelers clearly requires more: to warrant pre-emption, the effect
must be sufficiently strong that a court could find that the law effectively binds
employers to particular benefit-related choices or precludes a uniform
administrative scheme.
Few provider taxes, rate-setting schemes or other surcharges will have
such a strong effect on ERISA plans. However, one example of a tax or
surcharge that might fall within the scope of ERISA pre-emption as defined
by Travelers is a state mandated "pay-or-play" scheme. For example, rather
than directly mandating employers to provide health coverage, Massachusetts
enacted a tax and credit scheme that encourages employers to provide health
insurance coverage to employees.224 Under the scheme, employers must pay
a tax called a medical security contribution. 25 However, the amount of the
medical security contribution can be reduced to zero by deducting an
employer's per employee health care costs.226 The tax is comparable to the
cost of providing basic health coverage. The effect of such a tax will arguably
221. 849 F. Supp. at 1312.
222. See Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., 947 F.2d 1341, 1350
(8th Cir. 1991).
223. Boyle, 849 F. Supp. at 1317.
224. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A, §14G (Law. Co-op. 1989 and Supp. 1995).
225. Id. at § 14G(b).
226. Id. at § 14G(c).
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be more than merely influential. If a tax is comparable to the cost of coverage,
an employer could argue that it is faced with a Hobson's choice-that the result
is no real choice at all.227 Most taxing strategies incorporated into today's
health reform initiatives do not rise to this level.
In sum, as to taxes or surcharges that indirectly affect ERISA plans, the
framework for ERISA pre-emption after Travelers effectively delimits ERISA
pre-emption. Indeed, Travelers rejected the need to finely distinguish between
the various types of laws that involve taxes or surcharges when the Court
broadly stated that cost uniformity was not within the congressional objectives
underlying ERISA pre-emption. Thus, despite the fact that new and variant
provider taxes or surcharges may emerge in state reform movements,
congressional intent regarding pre-emption can be readily determined.
Travelers clearly indicates that taxes and surcharges on hospitals or on insurers
or HMOs that affect ERISA plans only by causing increased pass-through costs
are not within the congressional objectives underlying ERISA and should not
be pre-empted.
B. Taxes and Surcharges That Affect Self-Insured ERISA Plans
The Court in Travelers expressly excluded consideration of whether or
not the application of New York's rate-setting scheme to self-insured ERISA
plans was pre-empted.228 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that this
limitation does not narrow the general principle that state laws that merely have
an indirect, economic effect that may influence an employer's decisions
regarding benefit structures or administrative practices do not "relate to"
ERISA plans within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption provision.
In fact, the result would likely not have been different if the Court had
addressed whether application of New York's rate-setting provisions to self-
insured plans is pre-empted. The state law requires hospitals to increase
charges on certain patients' bills. When an insured plan is involved, the
patient's bill is paid by the payer-the commercial insurer or the HMO with
which the employer contracted. The payer then passes the increased costs
through to the employer in the form of increased insurance premiums or HMO
subscriptions. In the case of most self-insured ERISA plans, the bill is paid
227. On the other hand, a "tax and credit" scheme inherently involves a choice-pay the
tax or provide coverage.
228. "This case calls for us to decide whether [ERISA] pre-empts the state provisions for
surcharges on bills of patients whose commercial insurance coverage is purchased by employee
health-care plans governed by ERISA, and for surcharges on HMOs insofar as their membership
fees are paid by an ERISA plan." 115 S. Ct. at 1674-75. See also id. at 4 n.4 ("Nor do we
address the surcharge statute insofar as it applies to self-insured funds."). This limitation is
interesting given the fact that Travelers Insurance was a party to the suit in its capacity as a
fiduciary for self-insured ERISA plans.
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from a fund or trust set aside for health care coverage. The fund may or may
not be administered by a third-party administrator rather than the employer.
In either case, increased hospital charges are not reflected in increased
premiums, but are instead passed on as an increased cost of claims and are
merely absorbed by the fund or trust supporting the employees' coverage. In
that respect, the economic effect on self-insured ERISA plans is more
direct.229 However, for purposes of ERISA pre-emption, an effect is deemed
"indirect" any time the state law is not specifically designed to affect ERISA
plans.23 New York's rate-setting scheme was designed to ensure the viability
of plans such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans by dictating the amount
hospitals could charge, and thus constitutes an "indirect" effect even on self-
insured ERISA plans.
More importantly, the economic effect on self-insured plans is still merely
influential. Plans that self-insure are generally for large employers for whom
the increased charges that must be absorbed would be unlikely to create "no
choice" but to switch to Blue Cross plans. 231' Accordingly, upon remand of
the case in Travelers, the Second Circuit correctly rejected the insurers' request
to let the district court consider whether ERISA pre-empts the New York rate-
setting scheme with respect to self-insured plans.232 The court held that, even
as to self-insured plans, the rate-setting provisions were not pre-empted
because "whatever pressure the surcharge may exert on an ERISA plan's
decision to self-insure is no different from other economic influences on a
plan's decision to purchase insurance."233 Indeed, the court noted that the
229. The degree of economic impact would likely be comparable.
230. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1981) (noting
that the state law that banned pension benefit offsets based on workers' compensation "applies
directly" to a calculation technique; yet the Court characterized that statute as having an "indirect"
effect since it was accomplished through workers' compensation laws rather than "through a statute
called pension regulation.").
231. See generally, Caster, supra note 18.
232. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1995). Travelers Insurance
seized upon this loop-hole left open in the Supreme Court's opinion because it served as a
fiduciary to a self-insured plan. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1675 n.4. Because the record reflected
no material dispute of fact regarding the effect of the surcharges on self-insured plans, the Second
Circuit could determine the issue on remand as a matter of law even though the district court had
not considered the issue.
233. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1995). However, the Second
Circuit's analysis was questionable. The court noted that self-insured plans do not deserve special
treatment when determining whether a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan and is thus pre-
empted. "[A] plan's self-insured status matters only if a state law that should generally be pre-
empted under § 1144(a) qualifies as a law regulating insurance under the savings clause, §
1144(b)(2)(A)." Id. at 93. The court seemed to be suggesting that a separate pre-emption analysis
for self-insured plans was not necessary because ERISA's deemer clause, § 1144(b)(2)(B), does
not protect self-insured plans from laws that do not fall within the scope of ERISA's "relate to"
language. This reading of ERISA's pre-emption provisions is questionable since some state
insurance laws may not "relate to" ERISA plans, and yet, because they are "laws regulating
insurance," are not applicable to self-insured plans under the deemer clause. Moreover, a separate
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continued administration of self-insured plans by some of the Travelers
plaintiffs, despite the surcharge, suggested that few if any plans had decided
not to self-insure in light of the rate-setting system.234
Similarly, applying Travelers, the Second Circuit held that Connecticut's
surcharges on providers did not have a sufficient effect on self-insured plans
to result in pre-emption. 5 The court noted that "[w]e are well aware that
self-insured plans feel the bite of a surcharge statute more directly and more
deeply than do plans that purchase insurance. But, there was no proof that [the
law] actually increased self-insured plans' costs at all." 6 The court thus
found the distinction between insured and self-insured plans to be irrelevant
to the pre-emption issue.
Yet, whether a law's impact on self-insured plans triggers pre-emption
will not always be so clear. Self-insured plans may be structured in a multitude
of ways. Most employers simply assume the risk of health coverage for their
employees, and often contract with third-party administrators. The self-insured
plans in Travelers and New England Health Care fall into this category. An
insurer which serves as a third-party administrator, like Travelers Insurance,
often performs most functions that it would if it were insuring the fund. That
is, the insurer may contract with health care providers, negotiate
reimbursement rates, and administer claims by plan participants or
beneficiaries. The key distinction is that the insurer serving as the third-party
administrator is not underwriting the risks. It is the employer, or several
employers in a multi-employer fund, that performs the underwriting
function." 7
In contrast, some self-insured ERISA plans may go beyond setting up a
pre-emption analysis for self-insured plans is appropriate not because of the deemer clause, but
to determine whether a state law may have a greater connection with a self-insured plan.
234. Id. at 93. The court did not address the allegation raised at some point during the
proceedings that the rate-setting legislation referenced ERISA plans. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law
§ 2807-c(l)(b)(McKinney 1993) (imposing the 13% surcharge on bills of patients "enrolled in a
self-insured fund . . . ."). Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade merely indicated that "any state law
imposing requirements by reference to [ERISA plans] must yield to ERISA." Greater Wash. Bd.
of Trade, 113 S.Ct. at 582-83. See also NYS Health Maintenance Org. Conference v. Curiale,
1995 WL 515233 (2d Cir., Aug. 30, 1995) (exploring the parameters of the "reference to" prong
of ERISA pre-emption).
235. New England Health Care, 65 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995).
236. Id. at 1031. The surcharges imposed on hospitals varied during the course of the
litigation. However, unlike the surcharges at issue in Travelers, the surcharges imposed by
Connecticut law did not in theory increase hospitals fees because hospital rates have always
reflected cost-shifting to compensate for care to the indigent; the state law merely formalized that
practice. Thus, despite the fact that the self-insured plan was "one step closer to the surcharge
than are insured plans," the economic impact was clearly insufficient to trigger pre-emption. Id.
at 1032.
237. See Caster, supra note 18 at 419 ("[Tlhe critical attribute distinguishing self-funded
plans from state regulated plan is whether employers or insurance companies bear the risk of
paying for claims").
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trust or fund from which to pay for covered benefits and contracting with an
administrator. Instead, some employers may elect to have the plan own and
operate the facilities that provide health care benefits to plan participants and
beneficiaries. This type of self-insured plan presents more complex pre-
emption issues. For example, NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund v.
Axelrod,23 involved a pre-emption challenge to the application of a provider
tax upon a multi-employer, labor-management trust fund (the "Fund") which
provides health care benefits through three medical centers that it owns and
operates. The centers provide treatment exclusively to plan participants and
beneficiaries. 39 The New York provision at issue imposed a tax on the gross
receipts from patient care services and general operations of all hospitals and
a wide range of medical facilities in the state of New York. 2' The amount
of the assessment for the Fund's medical centers was 0.6% .241 Revenue was
transferred to the medical centers in various ways, but the pre-emption
challenge was limited to the extent that the law imposed a levy on contributions
and payments provided by the Fund for health care benefits.242
Before Travelers, the Second Circuit in Axelrod held that the challenged
assessment "related to" the Fund and thus was pre-empted by ERISA. The
court noted that the assessment was bound to affect ERISA plans generally:
the law targeted only the health care industry and, "[b]ecause this industry is,
by definition, the realm where ERISA welfare plans must operate, the [Act]
was bound to affect them."243 Further, because the ERISA plan in this case
had chosen to provide benefits through self-run medical centers, the court
found that the provision operated as "an immediate tax on payments and
contributions ... 244 More specifically:
The [tax] thus directly affects the Fund in its principle role as an
employee welfare benefits plan. It does not touch the Fund only
slightly on the outer limits of its plan activities; it affects the very
operations and functions that make the Fund what it is, a provider
of medical, surgical, and hospital care to its participants and their
beneficiaries .... The tax depletes those assets earmarked for the
238. 27 F.3d 823 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated by 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995) (vacated for review
in light of Travelers decision) [hereinafter Axelrod].
239. Id. at 825.
240. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807-d (1993) (known as the Health Facility Act, this
legislation was enacted in 1990). For purposes of the assessment, "gross receipts" include "all
monies received for or on account of hospital and health related services," subject to a few
exceptions. Id. at § 2807-d(3)(c).
241. Axelrod, 27 F.3d at 825 (citing Id. at § 2807-d(2)(c)).
242. Id. at 825-26.
243. Id. at 827.
244. Id.
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provision of health care benefits and, as a result, will cause the
Fund to reduce benefits provided and/or to charge beneficiaries
more in the future for benefits received. Both impacts will
detrimentally affect the central missions and purpose of the Fund
and hence cannot be characterized as remote or tenuous.245
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's
opinion and remanded for review in light of its decision in Travelers.
Although the Second Circuit has not issued an opinion in this case on
remand, the court has indicated that under Travelers the outcome should be
different.24 In analyzing the Axelrod case, the Second Circuit clearly used
a broader approach to pre-emption than the Court in Travelers. Under
Travelers, the first inquiry is whether the provider tax is within the domain
of traditional state regulation. Although health care provider taxes are a
relatively new legislative strategy, taxes are generally considered to be within
a state's police powers. Further, the purpose of the provider taxes are
generally to generate funds to accomplish a health policy objective and the tax
has an effect similar to any other tax that the medical centers may be required
to remit. Thus, the tax should be accorded the strong presumption against pre-
emption.247 The second inquiry is to identify the category of state laws that
are generally found to be pre-empted in which the tax falls. The provider tax
was not designed to apply to ERISA plans, but, rather, to medical facilities,
and does not reference ERISA plans, and the tax is clearly not a cause of
action within the scope of ERISA's enforcement provisions. Thus, if it is to
be pre-empted it must be because of an impermissible effect on employer
choices concerning benefit structures or administrative practices.
The issue would therefore become whether the economic effect of the
state law actually or practically binds employer decisions regarding benefit
structures or administrative practices. The state law in Axelrod requires the
medical centers to remit an assessment based, inter alia, upon gross receipts
from patient care services. Thus, to continue the same operations, the centers
will need greater contributions from the Fund. As with all self-insured plans,
the tax does not result in increased costs passed through to the plan via a
premium. Rather, the tax results in increased costs for services and is more
directly absorbed by the Fund. The Second Circuit viewed the depletion of
assets earmarked for the provision of benefits as dispositive. It is certainly true
245. Id.
246. See New England Health Care, 65 F.3d at 1032 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[I]n the wake of
Travelers. . . ,we question whether we should continue to distinguish between laws that directly
deplete ERISA plans' assets and laws that only indirectly do so.").
247. The Second Circuit did not expressly recognize that the state law at issue was a
regulation of health care and thus entitled to a strong presumption against pre-emption.
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that the employer may need to make some adjustments in the plan. However,
the effect of the law does not bind choices as to future benefit levels or
structures. Indeed, an employer could continue to offer the same
benefits-even in interstate plans if the employer desires.
Nonetheless, because the Fund owns and operates the medical centers
and the law requires facilities to remit an assessment, it could be argued that
the tax impermissibly mandates an "administrative practice." Because the
holding in Travelers did not elaborate on the types of state-mandated
administrative practices that may be pre-empted, it is necessary to draw on
Travelers' more general guidance regarding a pragmatic assessment of
congressional intent, namely, that courts must ensure that pre-emption of a law
designed to promote health policy objectives will serve the fundamental
objectives of the ERISA statute without causing undue adverse practical
consequences. The first issue then is whether requiring medical centers owned
by ERISA plans to remit a tax is the type of state law that would interfere with
nationally uniform administration of ERISA plans. To resolve this question,
it, in turn, becomes necessary to determine the appropriate scope of the phrase
"administration of the plan" or "administrative practices" for purposes of
ERISA pre-emption.
Fort Halifax articulates the clearest guidance from the Supreme Court
regarding the administrative practices which Congress was concerned about
when it enacted ERISA in 1974.4 At issue in Fort Halifax was a Maine
statute requiring a one-time severance payment to employees. The Court noted
that "Congress intended preemption to afford employers the advantages of a
uniform set of administrative procedures,"249 but also that congressional
concern regarding uniform procedures would arise only with respect to benefits
whose provision "by nature requires an ongoing administrative program" to
meet the employer's responsibility .' 0 The Court explained that employers
that establish and maintain ERISA plans are faced with the "task of
coordinating complex administrative activities,""' and "[a]n employer that
makes a commitment to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations
such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels,
making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit
payments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply with applicable
reporting requirements."252 Thus, the Court clearly focused on the
"employer's administrative scheme"253 or those procedures or practices that
248. See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
249. Id. at 11.
250. Id. at 11-12.
251. Id. at 11.
252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. at 10.
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an employer must perform in order to provide health care coverage.
Further, the Supreme Court's focus was on the on-going processes and
practices developed to effectuate the provision of benefits to plan participants
or beneficiaries; i.e., benefit-based practices akin to the claims administration
functions that an insurer traditionally performs for an insured plan. In Fort
Halifax the Court found that the law was not pre-empted because the employer
would assume no obligation to pay benefits on a regular basis and thus "faces
no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for financial coordination
and control. . . . To do little more than write a check hardly constitutes the
operation of a benefit plan."254 In exploring the relevant administrative
practices, the Court also referred to Alessi where the Court struck down a
statute that prohibited offsetting workers' compensation payments against
pension benefits. The Court noted that the effect of that statute was to make
the employer follow the benefit payment scheme under New Jersey law or
adopt a different payment formula for employees inside and outside of the
state- 55 These cases reinforce the Court's view that Congress was largely
concerned with administrative inefficiencies experienced by the employer.
An employer that elects to join with other employers to provide welfare
benefits through an ERISA plan that owns and operates medical centers has
certainly undertaken a host of obligations. Further, because of the many costs
considerations involved in operating a medical facility, the need to monitor the
availability of funds for the provision of benefits becomes particularly crucial.
However, a state tax upon medical centers owned by ERISA plans that may
cause a depletion of plan assets does not hinder uniformity of administration
procedures. Rather, the procedures designed by the employer to monitor the
assets can remain uniform. The impact of the tax is simply that the funds may
be depleted more rapidly and the employer may need to shop for cost savings
as to some aspect of the plan. Thus, limiting the phrase "administration of the
plan" to the employer's administrative scheme would result in the conclusion
that the state law does not impermissibly interfere with national uniformity of
ERISA plans.
Alternatively, the scope of the phrase "administration of the plan" could
be viewed as extending beyond the employer's administrative scheme, e.g.,
to the administrative scheme of an insurer, third-party administrator, or HMO
or other managed care organization (MCO) if appropriately limited. Because
the Court indicated that Congress was concerned with the on-going processes
and practices developed to effectuate an employer's provision of benefits to
plan participants or beneficiaries, a logical point of delimitation would be to
encompass only those functions provided directly for or specifically pertaining
254. Id. at 12.
255. Id. at 10 (citing Alessi, 451 U.S. 504 (1981)).
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to a particular employer and that employer's plan assets. This might include
functions such as determining eligibility of employees, providing information
about the plan to employees, processing claims including performing
precertification procedures, and managing the assets of the employer.
However, given the extreme variability in functions performed by different
segments of today's health care industry, precise factual analysis is crucial if
pre-emption is viewed as extending to practices performed by entities other
than the employer.
Specifically, the health care industry of today is significantly different
from what existed in 1974.256 In 1974, there was little variation in the
structure of health care plans. The employer either contracted with a traditional
indemnity insurer or elected to self-insure. Today, concepts such as managed
competition and managed care have resulted in tremendous variations. Health
care is provided through managed care networks or integrated delivery
systems. 7 In addition to contracting with third-party administrators or owning
or operating medical facilities as in Axelrod, employers that self-insure may
contract with integrated delivery systems which will provide care for
employees and beneficiaries.258 Further, a third-party administrator that an
employer may contract with may also be a part of an integrated network and
provide management services for the network.
Thus, even if the phrase "administration of the plan" is construed as
encompassing administrative services provided by other entities, many
functions of that entity may not be properly characterized as functions provided
directly for or specifically pertaining to a particular employer and that
employer's plan assets. Rather, the entity will also be engaging in its own
administration of its business. The administration of the entity's business of
course depends on the scope of its particular operations. For example, if the
entity which contracts with the employer also performs administrative functions
for the network, then it may engage in practices such as devising the managed
care measures which will be followed, educating the participating providers
of those procedures, and creating incentives which will help hold down costs
256. See generally ANNE M. STOLINE & JONATHON P. WEINER, THE NEW MEDICAL
MARKETPLACE: A PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN THE 1990S (1993).
257. See generally Michael J. Tichon, et al., Building Regional Integrated Delivery Systems
From the Ground Up, 15 WHITrIER L. REV. 89 (1994); Sheryl Dacso, et al., New Forms of
Hospital and Business Structures and Professional Arrangements as Influenced by Taxes,
Competition, and Health Care Reform, C884 ALI-ABA 595 (Feb. 10, 1994).
258. Employers, business groups and other sponsors of health care coverage, which
historically have negotiated independently, are beginning to join forces in negotiating managed
care contracts. For example, Monsanto Company, Ralston Purina and a dozen other members of
the St. Louis Area Business Health Coalition recently formed a health care purchasing group. "St.
Louis Area Businesses Join to Form Purchasing Cooperative," BNA HEALTH CARE DAtLY, Aug.
29, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 8/29/94 HCD d4 at 1.
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and thereby increase profits for the network. 29 Because pre-emption only
reaches laws that impermissibly infringe on practices that constitute
"administration of the plan," courts must distinguish between those practices
which pertain specifically to the claims management type of functions the entity
is performing for an employer, and those functions it is performing for the
network.
Even under this broader interpretation of the scope of the phrase
"administration of the plan," the provider tax in Axelrod would not be pre-
empted. In Axelrod, the Fund owned and operated three medical centers and
thus is involved in a multitude of processes and practices necessary to function
as a provider of health care-e.g., facilities licensure, credentialing of medical
professionals, and other quality of care requirements. These practices are in
addition to and distinguishable from the functions that relate to providing health
care coverage to employees. The tax is imposed on the centers as providers
of care. Remission of the tax thus falls within the scope of the administrative
practices of the medical center-not within the scope of the "administration
of the plan." Although the Fund must somehow find a way to disburse more
money to the centers, a pragmatic assessment of the pre-emption question
reasonably leads to the conclusion that the state law does not infringe on the
types of administrative practices that Congress could have intended to protect.
Pre-emption of the tax provision would not further core congressional goals
underlying ERISA because the employer's interstate ERISA plans can be
maintained and relevant administrative practices can still be designed in a
uniform manner.260
Moreover, the "logical stopping point" rationale stressed by the Court
in Travelers strongly supports this conclusion. If a tax upon a medical facility
were to be pre-empted merely because the facility is owned or operated by a
self-insured ERISA plan, there would seem to be no logical stopping point to
ERISA pre-emption. Other state laws that result in increased costs for
providers of care-e.g., heightened quality of care standards-would arguably
be pre-empted as well. As the Court in Travelers noted, "[tihe bigger the
package of regulation with indirect effects that would fall . . . the less likely
it is that federal regulation of benefit plans was intended to eliminate state
regulation of health care costs."261 Thus, even as to self-insured ERISA
welfare plans that choose to own or operate the facilities that provide health
care services for covered participants and beneficiaries, use of Travelers
259. See generally Karen A. Jordan, Managed Competition & Limited Choice of Providers:
Countering Negative Perceptions Through A Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians,
27 ARIz. STATE L.J. 875 (1995) (explaining many of the functions that managed competition
networks can, do and should engage in).
260. Indeed, the Fund in Axelrod operated in more than one state.
261. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
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framework along with careful analysis of Supreme Court precedent renders
it difficult to reach the conclusion that Congress intended for ERISA to pre-
empt provider taxes.
C. Contract and Tort Claims
In addition to provider taxes and other surcharges, lower courts are
increasingly finding pre-emption of state law contract and tort claims brought
by plan participants or beneficiaries against health care providers or plan
administrators or brought by health care providers against plan administrators.
As with cases involving surcharges or taxes, the outcomes on the issue of
ERISA pre-emption have been inconsistent-indeed, the situation might be
characterized as one of utter confusion on the issue.262 Various rationales
are used by the courts in resolving the pre-emption issue: e.g., (1) the claim
is really a claim for benefits or a claim for improper processing of the
claim, 263 (2) the claim affects plans by causing pass-through costs that will
result in the plan having to choose between higher costs or a reduction in
benefits,26 (3) the claim regulates the administration of the plan,2"' (4) the
claim arises from the provision of benefits pursuant to an ERISA plan266 or
(5) the claim requires an examination of plan documents.267 In cases
involving contract or tort claims, courts often use several of these
rationales .26' The effectiveness of the Travelers framework in restraining the
scope of ERISA pre-emption of state contract and tort claims is less clear.269
262. See Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995)
(collecting cases). Compare Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding state negligence claim pre-empted), rev'd on other ground, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that action was not removable because negligence claim was not within the scope of
ERISA § 502(a)) with Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
that claim that plan administrator vicariously liable for doctor's negligence not pre-empted by
ERISA, but various tort and contract claims relating to plan administration pre-empted).
263. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)
264. See, e.g., Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993).
265. See, e.g., Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
266. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Md. 1994).
267. See, e.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
268. See, e.g., id.; Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp.
39 (E.D. 1994) (holding state tort claims pre-empted), rev'd on other grounds, 57 F.3d 350 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding that action was not removable because tort claims were not within the scope
of ERISA § 502(a)).
269. Remember that some courts may not accept the premise that Travelers is applicable
to state contract and tort claims because common law claims are clearly distinguishable from
legislative provisions imposing rate-setting schemes, provider taxes or other surcharges. However,
the central thesis in this article is that the Travelers opinion can be construed as a strong signal
that ERISA pre-emption should be restrained. Accordingly, this section of the article explores
whether the framework for analyzing ERISA pre-emption after Travelers can effectively limit
overly expansive applications of ERISA pre-emption to contract and tort claims.
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However, a broad construction of Travelers and careful scrutiny of Supreme
Court precedent can lead to the conclusion that many claims that lower courts
have found to be pre-empted should not be pre-empted, and can lead to more
consistent and predictable outcomes.
One reason to believe that Travelers will inevitably affect the pre-emption
issue as to state contract and tort claims is Travelers' emphasis of the
fundamental premise that state common law claims should be accorded a
weighty presumption against pre-emption. Lower courts have often disregarded
this fundamental principle of pre-emption analysis.27 Without doubt, contract
and tort claims are within the domain of traditional state police power. Such
claims serve a more fundamental purpose than to impose benefit or
administrative obligations upon ERISA plans; rather, common law contract and
tort claims help ensure socially responsible behavior. Thus, such claims should
not be deemed pre-empted absent clear congressional intent.
Further, use of the Travelers framework would likely affect the pre-
emption issue in another important way. The pragmatic and more delineated
analytical framework could lead lower courts out of the current state of utter
confusion. That is, if courts adopt a uniform approach to the pre-emption
question, there is at least a greater potential for uniformity in the outcome. In
applying the Travelers framework to state law causes of action, the threshold
inquiry is to identify the appropriate category of laws to which the state claim
belongs. That is, (1) is the cause of action one that was designed specifically
to apply to ERISA plans or one that imposes a duty on employers or
administrators by express reference to ERISA plans; (2) is the claim within
the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions; or (3) does the cause of
action relate to ERISA plans because of its effect on employer or administrator
decisions concerning benefit structure or administration of the plan? Accurately
resolving this inquiry and following through with the analysis as detailed below
should go a long way toward both restraining and rationalizing pre-emption
outcomes.
1. Claims Designed Specifically to Apply to ERISA Plans or to Impose a
Duty on Employers or Administrators by Express Reference to ERISA
Plans
As noted in section I.A., the Supreme Court has found that common law
claims "relate to" ERISA plans in only two cases.27' In Pilot Life, the Court
270. See, e.g., Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d
1341 (8th Cir. 1991).
271. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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found state tort and contract claims based on allegedly improper processing
of claims under an insured ERISA plan to be pre-empted.272 In Ingersoll-
Rand, the Court held that ERISA pre-empted a common law claim establishing
an exception to the doctrine of at-will employment where an employee is
unlawfully discharged primarily because of the employer's desire to avoid
contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension fund. 273 The
Court expressly stated that the claim in Ingersoll-Rand fell within the principle
enunciated in Mackey-that laws which are specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans are pre-empted. "The facts here are slightly different
but the principle is the same: The Texas cause of action makes specific
reference to, and indeed is premised on, the existence of a pension plan."274
Thus, state common law causes of action can be found to be pre-empted by
ERISA if they impose a duty on ERISA plans by reference. In determining
whether the pre-emption analysis after Travelers can lead to a more restrained
application to contract and tort claims, the issue is whether Travelers indicates
that most contract and tort claims do not fall within this category of state laws.
In Ingersoll-Rand, the Court found that the existence of a pension plan
and a pension-defeating motive are essential elements in the Texas cause of
action.275 Thus, in the words used by the Court in Greater Washington Board
of Trade, the common law duty imposed by the action is established by
reference to ERISA plans and indeed does not arise absent an ERISA plan.276
Most state contract and tort claims are distinguishable. The elements of the
claims can generally be stated without referencing ERISA plans.277
The general common law duties are therefore established by courts
without referencing ERISA plans and persons are subject to the common law
duties regardless of ERISA plans. Under certain circumstances, however, an
argument could be made that contract and tort claims fall within this category
of pre-empted state laws. For example, if a claim is for breach of a contractual
term set forth in an ERISA plan, then arguably the duty arose only because
of the contractual nature of an ERISA plan. If a tort claim is for negligent
conduct in conjunction with the provision of benefits under an ERISA plan,
then arguably the duty to use care only arose because of the duties undertaken
in accordance with the ERISA plan.
Nonetheless, the duty involved in Ingersoll-Rand is still distinguishable.
In that case, there was no general common law duty relating to the termination
272. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
273. 498 U.S. 133 (1990). See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
274. Id. at 140.
275. Id.
276. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S.Ct. 580 (1992). See
also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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of an employee. Employers in Texas may generally terminate employees at-
will. The cause of action therefore represented judicial creation of a distinct
common law duty. Yet contract and tort claims, even if they hinge in some
respects on an ERISA plan, do not result in distinct common law duties.
Employers, insurers, and plan administrators have a duty to uphold lawful
contracts and providers must generally use reasonable care when undertaking
to provide services.
A strong argument can be made that Travelers supports this view and can
therefore lead to a more restrained application of ERISA pre-emption to
contract and tort claims. The field of state regulation via contract and tort law
is sufficiently large that, absent clear guidance from Congress, pre-emption
is inappropriate. The outer bounds of pre-emption concerning state causes of
action that may be characterized as designed specifically to apply to ERISA
plans or to impose a duty on employers or administrators by express reference
to ERISA plans are far from clear. Precisely because it is not clear to what
extent Congress intended to pre-empt common law contract and tort claims,
the presumption against pre-emption should apply. Travelers therefore suggests
that adopting the narrower approach is more appropriate, i.e., a contract or
tort claim should be placed into this category of laws that may be pre-empted
only if the claim represents judicial creation of a distinct duty that exists and
is imposed only because of the existence of an ERISA plan. Because few
contract or tort claims will meet this standard, pre-emption of claims based
on this rationale will be restrained.
2. Claims Within the Scope of ERISA's Civil Enforcement Provisions
In Pilot Life and Ingersoll-Rand the Court used the rationale that the
claims were within ERISA's civil enforcement provisions to support its
holdings that the common law claims at issue related to ERISA plans. In
Travelers, the Court expressly referred to this category of state laws as those
that provide "an alternative enforcement mechanism."278 However, several
lower courts have gone further and held that even common law claims that are
not claims under ERISA are pre-empted because they are nonetheless within
the scope of Pilot Life.279 Travelers' signal to restrain pre-emption and to
identify logical stopping points for ERISA pre-emption arguably leads to the
conclusion that these lower courts have expanded pre-emption based on this
rationale beyond "clear" congressional intent'
Specifically, the Court's restoration of the presumption against pre-
278. 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
279. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Kuhl
v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
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emption of state laws within the traditional police power of the states, as well
as the Court's emphasis on identifying logical lines of delimitation, suggest that
two issues must be considered. First, it must be determined whether Pilot Life
justifies pre-emption of claims that are not within the scope of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions. Stated differently, should ERISA be construed as pre-
empting claims-not merely remedies-that are not prescribed by its
enforcement provisions? Careful analysis of prior Supreme Court cases
suggests not. Further, a strong argument can be made that pre-emption of
claims not within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision does not
significantly advance core ERISA objectives. Second, courts must distinguish
with greater precision claims for benefits or improper processing of claims
(which are within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions), and,
e.g., claims for negligent acts or omissions otherwise committed in the
administration of the plan (which may not be within the scope of the civil
enforcement provisions). If lower courts consider these issues, then the scope
of ERISA pre-emption based on the rationale that a claim is within the scope
of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions may be effectively restrained.
a. Claims That Are Not Within the Scope of ERISA's Civil Enforcement
Provisions Are Not Automatically Pre-empted
Careful scrutiny of Supreme Court precedent indicates that ERISA pre-
emption should encompass any attempt to obtain, via state contract or tort
claim, remedies for wrongs addressed by ERISA that are not expressly
prescribed in the civil enforcement provisions set forth in section 502(a) of
ERISA. However, the language of ERISA and Supreme Court interpretations
do not indisputably support the premise that any contract or tort claim-even
those for wrongs not addressed by ERISA-must be pre-empted. Thus, it is
meritorious to argue that, if Travelers is a signal for restraint in the scope of
ERISA pre-emption-especially as to state laws within the traditional domain
of state police powers-then courts should adopt the view that contract and tort
claims based on wrongs that are not addressed by ERISA are not automatically
pre-empted.280
Analysis of this argument must begin with the language of section 502(a)
of ERISA, which sets forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme.28'
280. This is not to say that state law causes of action that do not fall within the scope of
section 502(a) should never be pre-empted. However, the proper pre-emption analysis is to treat
such state law causes of action as other laws that arguably impermissibly affect the benefit
structure or administrative practices of ERISA plans. See infra notes 341-91 and accompanying
text.
281. In its entirety, § 502(a) reads:
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
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The section prescribes, inter alia, that a civil action may be brought:
(1) by a participant or beneficiary . . . (B) to recover benefits due
to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan;2 s2 (2) . . . by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title
[breach of fiduciary duty]; (3) by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice that violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan[.]283
The language emphasizes that the scheme is largely remedial in nature. The
provisions of section 502(a) primarily prescribe what relief certain persons may
obtain. The basis for relief-i.e., the wrongs upon which a right to relief under
ERISA can be based-are not set forth in section 502(a), but must be derived
from the statute as a whole or from the terms of an ERISA plan.
In Pilot Life, the Court held that claims against the insurance company,
including tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud in
the inducement,2  were pre-empted. The Court characterized these
contractually-based claims as being based on "alleged improper processing of
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the
case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter,
or (B) to obtain other appropriate relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce
any provision of this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalties under subsection (i) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988).
283. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
284. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1987).
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a claim for benefits."2 5 Thus, the claims were construed as seeking either
to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan or to obtain relief for
breach of a fiduciary duty. In Ingersoll-Rand, the claim was based on
discharging a plan participant in retaliation for exercising a vested right under
the plan, which is rendered unlawful by section 510 of ERISA.286 The claim
could thus be characterized as a claim to enjoin an act that violated ERISA.
Both claims were therefore within the remedial provisions prescribed in section
502(a).
In Pilot Life, the Court explained that "[t]he civil enforcement scheme
of section 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated
purposes of ERISA. 287 Yet the Court merely adopted the argument that:
Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions
by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper
processing of a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of
action for claims within the scope of § 502(a) would pose an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.2 8
In Ingersoll-Rand, the Court explained that Pilot Life made clear "that
Congress intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed
285. Id. at 48. Pilot Life does not provide much insight as to the exact nature of the acts
which constituted improper processing in that case. The Court in Pilot Life merely informs us that
the employer had a long-term disability benefit plan established by purchasing a group policy
through Pilot Life Insurance Company. The employer forwarded completed claims forms to Pilot
Life. Pilot Life bore the responsibility for determining who would receive disability benefits. The
plaintiff Dedeaux sought permanent benefits, but Pilot Life terminated benefits after two years
and then reinstated and terminated benefits several times during the following three years. The
claim, then, was for failure to provide benefits under the plan. A claim seeking benefits is clearly
within the scope of ERISA's enforcement provisions.
286. In its entirety, § 510 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline,
or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter,
section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act [29
U.S.C. § 301 et seq.], or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any
right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter,
or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be unlawful for any person
to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he
has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
The provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement
of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
287. 481 U.S. at 52.
288. Id. at 52 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-19) (emphasis added).
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under ERISA ... "289 Therefore, in both cases the Court emphasized the
fact that the claims were pre-empted because they were addressed by ERISA's
enforcement scheme and involved rights protected by ERISA. The claims could
therefore be pursued under ERISA itself.
Nonetheless, lower courts have gone much further by finding state
contract and tort claims pre-empted even where the claim is not addressed by
ERISA and the plaintiff is thus left with no avenue for relief.29° For example,
in Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. ,29 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
broadly stated that if a claim involves negligence in making a coverage
decision or a benefit determination then it is within the scope of Pilot
Life-despite the fact that the claim involved was not within the scope of
section 502(a) of ERISA. Corcoran involved a claim for damages as a result
of negligence by a defendant in the benefit determination process. The
Corcorans' unborn child died after a utilization review provider for the ERISA
plan through which the Corcorans obtained health coverage negligently
determined that hospitalization of the mother was not necessary. Instead of
hospitalization, United Healthcare, the entity which provided utilization review
services for the ERISA plan, authorized ten hours per day of home nursing
care. During a period of time when no nurse was on duty, the fetus went into
distress and died.292
The court characterized the claim as "a tort allegedly committed in the
course of handling a benefit determination. "293 The court acknowledged that
the nature of the benefit determination was different from the type of decision
that was at issue in Pilot Life, but held that the mere fact that it was a "benefit
determination" sufficed for the claim to fall within the scope of Pilot Life's
holding that "ERISA pre-empts state-law claims alleging improper handling
of benefit claims. "294
However, the Corcorans' claim was not addressed by ERISA's
enforcement provisions. Although a claim by a participant or beneficiary, the
claim was not based on a violation of the terms of the ERISA plan nor on a
violation of ERISA. Rather, the Corcorans' claim was essentially a malpractice
claim against the utilization review provider for making an erroneous medical
determination. In justifying pre-emption of the claim, the court focused on the
fact that the Corcorans were seeking remedies not prescribed by ERISA,
289. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990) (emphasis added).
290. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable
HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 2 (1992).
291. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
292. Id. at 1324. The Corcorans' filed a wrongful death claim which alleged that the child
died as a result of acts of negligence by United Healthcare.
293. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
294. Id.
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specifically, emotional distress and mental anguish.295
Like other courts which have held state law causes of action to be pre-
empted despite the fact that the plaintiff is then left without an avenue for
relief, the court in Corcoran noted that:
The acknowledged absence of a remedy under ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme for medical malpractice committed in
connection with a plan benefit determination does not alter our
conclusion. While we are not unmindful of the fact that our
interpretation of the pre-emption clause leaves a gap in remedies
within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit
plans, the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption
analysis.296
Notably, this statement reveals that courts are inappropriately equating the term
remedy with the term claim. Yet there is a distinction between claims and
remedies.297
Section 502(a) indicates that only certain wrongs can be the basis of a
claim under ERISA, and affords distinct remedies for those wrongs. Section
502(a) articulates who can bring a civil action,"' gives some indication of
295. Id. at 1338. Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit characterized the action as a claim
involving a benefit determination, the court specifically held that the claim did not fall within
section 502(a)(3). Id. at 1334-35. In analyzing the issue, the court noted that equitable relief is
accorded by that subsection, Id. at 1335 (§ 502(a)(3) provides for "other equitable relief"), and
presumed that equitable relief might encompass some "make-whole damages"-that is, damages
necessary to make the plaintiff whole. Id. at 1336. The court merely made a presumption because
the Supreme Court expressly stated that its holding in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, that extra-contractual or punitive damages are not available in a claim for improper
processing of a claim, did not address claims within the scope of § 502(a)(3). 437 U.S. 134, 155
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). However, the court was confident that § 502(a)(3) would not
include damages for the emotional distress and mental anguish. Corcoran, 905 F.2d at 1336.
Similarly, the court in Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City expressly declined
to recognize a claim based on § 502(a)(3)(B) because it held that monetary damages could not
constitute "other appropriate equitable relief" within the meaning of the that subsection. 999 F.2d
298, 305 (8th Cir. 1993). But see Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 982 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2256 (1991). Yet Justice Brennan, with several justices agreeing,
has noted that trust-law remedies, although equitable in nature, can include monetary damages.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 154 n. 10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Thus, even determining what remedies are within ERISA's enforcement provisions will often be
a thorny issue.
296. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333 (citations omitted).
297. Whether a plaintiff has a claim depends on whether the substantive law prescribes
that a plaintiff can recover for the alleged wrongful acts of a defendant. If so, a distinct remedial
inquiry is what relief may be accorded for a violation of a substantive right. See Dan B. Dobbs,
LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1993).
298. E.g., participants and beneficiaries.
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the wrongs that can form the basis for the action,299 and prescribes certain
remedies. 3" The claims addressed by ERISA stem from the specific wrongs
that can form the basis for the action-i.e., a participant may bring a claim
for violation of the terms of the plan or for violation of ERISA's provisions.
The remedies available for those wrongs include benefits due, a declaration
of rights, or an injunction of acts that violate the statute. Because the claim
in Corcoran did not stem from a violation of the terms of the ERISA plan or
of ERISA, the claim was not within the scope of section 502(a), and thus not
within the scope of Pilot Life.
The distinction between claims and remedies is important because,
although the Supreme Court has stated that a lack of a remedy under ERISA
does not alter the pre-emptive force of ERISA,3' the Court has never held
that the lack of a claim under ERISA does not affect the scope of ERISA.
Further, the statement that lack of a remedy does not negate pre-emption was
expressed in the context of justifying pre-emption of a claim within the scope
of section 502(a). In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,"2
the Court held that extra-contractual and punitive damages are not available
in a claim under section 502(a)(1)(B) enforcing a violation of section 409(a)
of ERISA. The Court found that the legislative history and structure of
ERISA's remedial scheme negated the inference that Congress intended to
permit recovery of such damages in a claim for breach of fiduciary duties:
"The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)
of the statute . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly."303
In Pilot Life, the Court drew upon Russell's holding to support the finding
that ERISA pre-empted the state causes of action seeking relief for improper
processing of claims.3" The Court explained that:
[Section] 502(a) ... represents a careful balancing of the need for
prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and
299. E.g., violation of the terms of the plan or violation of ERISA's provisions.
300. E.g., benefits due, declaration of rights, an injunction of acts that violate the statute.
See also supra note 281.
301. See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52-57.
302. 473 U.S. 134 (1985) [hereinafter Russell].
303. Id. at 146. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion reiterated the narrowness of the
Court's holding in Russell. "This case presents a single, narrow question: whether the § 409
,appropriate relief' referred to in § 502(a)(2) includes individual recovery by a participant or
beneficiary of extra-contractual damages for breach of fiduciary duty." Id. at 149 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
304. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52-57.
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the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries
were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected
in ERISA.3 °5
But Pilot Life also involved a claim that the Court readily found to be within
the scope of section 502(a)(1)(B)-a claim for benefits under the terms of the
plan. In such a case it may be argued that the balance between public and
private interests would be disrupted by permitting a plaintiff to recover on a
state claim when the plaintiff can recover limited damages, such as recovery
of benefits due, under ERISA itself. Arguably, however, the balance between
private and public interests is equally undermined if egregious acts of
employers or claims administrators go totally unredressed because of an overly
broad construction of ERISA pre-emption.
Moreover, the legislative history does not indisputably lead to the
conclusion that Congress intended for ERISA to pre-empt claims that are not
addressed by section 502(a). The relevant legislative history was discussed
extensively in Pilot Life. In Pilot Life, the Court noted only that "varying state
causes of action for claims within the scope of§ 502(a) would pose an obstacle
to the purposes and objectives of Congress. "36 Moreover, the Court quoted
from the Conference Report describing section 502(a), which notes that with
respect to suits within the scope of section 502(a), "[a]ll such actions in
Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ["LMRA"]." °7 The Court
explained that Congress was aware that the powerful pre-emptive force of
section 301 of the LMRA "displaced all state actions for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization, even when the state action
purported to authorize a remedy unavailable under the federal provision."308
The Court then noted that Congress's specific reference to section 301 to
describe ERISA's civil enforcement provisions "makes clear its intention that
all suits brought by beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing
of claims under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal questions governed
by § 502(a). 3 9
Two points drive home the conclusion that the legislative history of
section 502(a) impliedly indicates only that where a person has a claim that
is addressed by ERISA, that the claimant is limited to the remedies prescribed.
305. Id. at 54.
306. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
307. Id. at55 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974)).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 56.
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First, the statements suggest that both ERISA pre-emption and LMRA pre-
emption are limited to claims that are within the scope of the federal statutes:
actions based on violations of labor contracts are clearly addressed by the
LMRA310 and actions to enforce rights or to recover benefits due under ERISA
plans are addressed by ERISA. Second, the comparison to section 301 is more
relevant to jurisdictional issues than to the pre-emption issue. The Conference
Report stresses that claims within section 502(a) are to be "regarded as arising
under the laws of the United States," and the Court explained that such actions
should be treated as "federal questions." These statements can be used as
support for use of the complete pre-emption doctrine for purposes of removal
jurisdiction more readily than they can be used as an indication of the scope
of laws that "relate to" ERISA plans.311
Significantly, however, the scope of the complete pre-emption doctrine
sheds light on the issue at hand. The doctrine of complete pre-emption is an
exception to the general rule that a federal pre-emption defense does not render
a plaintiffs state law claim filed in state court subject to removal to federal
court. " 2 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff's common law state claims were completely pre-
empted-and thus that the action was removable-because the claims were
within the scope of section 502(a)(1)(B).313 That is, because the claims were
310. "[Section] 301(a) of the LMRA apples to all '[sluits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
.. or between any such labor organizations.' We have not taken a restrictive view of who may
sue under § 301 for violations of such contracts, (citations omitted). But even under §301 we have
never intimated that any action merely relating to a contract within the coverage of § 301 arises
exclusively under that section. For instance, a state battery suit growing out of a violent strike
would not arise under § 301 simply because the strike may have been a violation of an employer-
union contract. (citations omitted)." Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust
for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 25 n.28 (1983) [hereinafter Franchise Tax Bd.].
311. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-66 (1987) (after
explaining the "complete pre-emption" exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court
held that the exception is narrowly limited in the ERISA context to state common law or statutory
claims that fall within the scope of section 502(a) because the "legislative history consistently sets
out this clear intention to make [section 502(a)] suits brought by plan participants or beneficiaries
federal questions for the purpose of federal court jurisdiction . . . . "). See also Warner v. Ford
Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1995) (reiterating that removal and pre-emption are two
distinct concepts).
312. By statute, a civil action brought in a state court may be removed to federal court
only if the claim is one over which the district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1988). Among other categories of cases, district courts have original jurisdiction over
claims "arising under the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988). A claim arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises
issues of federal law. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (citing Gully
v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908)). Federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense; because it does not appear on the
face of a well-pleaded complaint, it does authorize removal to federal court. Id.
313. 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987). The claims in Taylor included a breach of contract claim
and a tort claim for wrongful termination in retaliation for a workers' compensation claim. The
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displaced by federal claims under ERISA, the only claims that existed were
federal claims which the Conference Report indicated should be regarded as
"arising under" the laws of the United States.314 Removal is appropriate in
such a case in order to preclude plaintiffs who engage in artful pleading from
depriving a defendant of the right to have a federal claim heard in federal
court.3 15
The scope of ERISA pre-emption is clearly broader than the scope of
claims that fall within the complete pre-emption doctrine.31 6 Significantly,
however, the scope of claims that may be pre-empted by virtue of falling
within the scope of Pilot Life and Ingersoll-Rand, is arguably the same as the
scope of the complete pre-emption doctrine. In Pilot Life, the Court determined
that the claims were pre-empted because the claims at issue were claims for
benefits "within the scope of section 502(a)." In Taylor, the Court found clear
congressional intent to permit removal of state law claims "within the scope
of section 502(a)." Because the Court used the same language, the scope of
these precedents should be similarly construed.
The Supreme Court has spoken more definitively in the context of the
complete pre-emption doctrine. The Court has indicated that removal should
be limited to those situations where a plaintiff's state law claim is displaced
by section 502(a).317 That is, if a state claim is not necessarily federal in
nature by virtue of being, in reality, a claim that may be brought under section
502(a), the doctrine of complete pre-emption is not available. That does not
mean that the claim is not pre-empted, but, rather, that the claim is not
removable. Logically, then, a strong argument exists that state law claims
should not be found pre-empted by virtue of falling within the scope of Pilot
Life unless the claim is similarly displaced by section 502(a).
Viewed from this perspective, courts should be hesitant to rely solely on
plaintiff was seeking compensatory damages, reinstatement of benefits and insurance coverage,
and damages for mental anguish. Both claims fell within § 502(a): Taylor was seeking recovery
of benefits and a remedy for a violation of ERISA, which prohibits termination in retaliation for
exercising rights under an ERISA plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988).
314. Id. at 66. See also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25-26 (1983) (finding that the
state's action to enforce a tax against funds in an ERISA plan was not within the complete pre-
emption doctrine because ERISA did not provide an alternative cause of action in favor of the
state).
315. Cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (explaining that the "artful
pleading" doctrine cannot be invoked where a state claim is not within the complete pre-emption
doctrine).
316. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25 (noting that § 502(a) "does not purport to
reach every question relating to plans covered by ERISA").
317. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 1 (1983). See also Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc. 57 F.3d 350 (3d
Cir. 1995). But see Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA does not
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a broad interpretation of the reach of Pilot Life to find state common law
claims pre-empted when the plaintiff is left without any avenue of redress
based on ERISA. The legislative history supports only the conclusion that
Congress intended for section 502(a) to limit remedies available in claims
under ERISA, and to require that claims within the scope of section 502(a) be
pursued under section 502(a). And the Court has stated only that the
comprehensive legislative scheme of section 502(a) impliedly indicates that,
where a person has a claim that is addressed by ERISA, the claimant is limited
to the remedies prescribed."' Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of
ERISA and of the Court's holdings is that ERISA will not automatically pre-
empt state law claims based on wrongs which ERISA does not address.3"9
This conclusion is bolstered by the Court's characterization of this
category of laws in Travelers. Rather than labeling this category of laws as
claims within ERISA's enforcement provision, the Court concluded that state
claims that constitute an "alternative enforcement mechanism" are pre-
empted.320 If a state claim is for a wrong that is not addressed in section
502(a), then the state claim cannot be an "alternative" to an ERISA action.
Travelers made clear that pre-emption of laws within the traditional police
power is inappropriate absent a clear indication of congressional intent.
Application of the framework for the pre-emption analysis after Travelers
would therefore suggest that claims that do not fall within the scope of section
502(a) of ERISA should not be pre-empted on the basis of being within the
scope of Pilot Life's holding.
Rather, a reasonable conclusion is that, in determining whether a law is
within the scope of Pilot Life, a court should engage in a narrow analysis of
whether the specific claim at issue is truly an "alternative enforcement
mechanism," i.e., is a claim within the scope of section 502(a).32' This is
318. For example, the claim in Ingersoll-Rand was found to be within the scope of §
502(a) because an employer who terminates an employee for incurring substantial medical expenses
covered by the ERISA plan violates the terms of ERISA. The employee as a participant in the
plan would be entitled to institute a civil action to enforce the provision in ERISA which precludes
retaliatory conduct.
319. See International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 298 (6th
Cir. 1991); Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d. 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
320. 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
321. Notably, this will not always be an easy determination to make because federal courts
have been slow to develop claims under the six integrated enforcement provisions in § 502(a).
For example, § 502(a)(3)(B) arguably permits a claim for equitable relief by a plan participant
or beneficiary against a plan administrator or fiduciary for failing to use diligence and prudence
in the benefit determination process as in Corcoran. Section 502(a)(3) prescribes that a civil action
may be brought "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary . .. to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the
terms or the plan .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988). Further, § 404(a) provides that a
"fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
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not to say that state law causes of action that do not fall within the scope of
section 502(a) should never be pre-empted. However, the proper pre-emption
analysis is to treat such state law causes of action in the same manner as other
laws that arguably impermissibly affect the benefit structure or administrative
practices of ERISA plans.322
b. Defining a Claim for Improper Processing of Claims
The Travelers framework for ERISA pre-emption also suggests that in
analyzing whether a particular state law action should be pre-empted because
it is within the scope of Pilot Life's holding, courts need to distinguish with
greater precision a claim for improper processing of claims or a claim for
benefits and, e.g., claims for negligent acts or omissions otherwise committed
in the administration of the plan. The Court in Pilot Life held that a claim for
"improper processing of claims" is within the scope of section 502(a). Further,
the Supreme Court has made clear that plaintiffs with claims within the scope
of section 502(a) are limited to the prescribed remedies. Because Travelers
suggests that the scope of ERISA should be properly restrained, it becomes
crucial to accurately determine when a claim is really a claim for "improper
processing of claims."
In Corcoran, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death claim which alleged that
their child died as a result of acts of negligence by United Healthcare.3 23 The
Fifth Circuit held that the cause of action was pre-empted because it was really
an action for improper processing of the Corcorans' claim for benefits, and
thus within the scope of Pilot Life's holding.324 Other lower courts have also
broadly held that any claim involving a benefit determination or the process
of administering benefits is within the scope of Pilot Life-because it is really
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims .... " 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a) (1988).
If a state law claim is deemed to be within the scope of ERISA's enforcement
provisions-for example, because it is really a claim under § 502(a)(3)-then it would be pre-
empted under Pilot Life and Travelers. But the claim could then be pursued as an ERISA claim,
although subject to the limited remedies available under ERISA. See Massachusetts Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 150 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (expressly stating that
the holding that actions under § 502(a)(1) or § 502(a)(2) do not permit extra-contractual or punitive
damages does not resolve to what extent extra-contractual damages are available under §
502(a)(3)). The important point is that Travelers arguably provides an argument that if the claim
is not within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, it cannot be deemed pre-empted
pursuant to Pilot Life. Rather, the pre-emption question must instead hinge on whether the effect
of the state cause of action meets the standard set forth in Travelers.
322. See infra notes 341-91 and accompanying text.
323. Corcoran, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
324. Id. at 1332.
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a claim for benefits. These statements flow from language in Pilot Life325
that claims for tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud
in the inducement 26 were pre-empted because they were based on "alleged
improper processing of a claim for benefits."327 However, the Court's
holding in Pilot Life that the claims "related to" ERISA plans was entirely
conclusory: "The common law causes of action raised in Dedeaux's complaint
• . . undoubtedly meet the criteria for pre-emption under § 514(a). "328 No
rationale for why the claims related to ERISA plans was articulated, and it is
not clear what particular acts by Pilot Life constituted the alleged improper
processing. It is therefore questionable whether the ambiguous phrase
"improper processing of a claim for benefits" should be applied with the broad
sweep it has been accorded.
Pilot Life provides little insight as to the exact nature of the acts which
constituted improper processing in that case. The Court in Pilot Life merely
informed us that the employer had a long-term disability benefit plan
established by purchasing a group policy through Pilot Life Insurance
Company. The employer forwarded completed claims forms to Pilot Life. Pilot
Life bore the responsibility for determining who would receive disability
benefits. The plaintiff Dedeaux sought permanent benefits, but Pilot Life
terminated benefits after two years and then reinstated and terminated benefits
several times during the following three years. The claim, then, was for failure
to provide benefits promised under the terms of the plan. A claim seeking
benefits is clearly within the scope of ERISA's remedial provisions and thus
is justifiably pre-empted.
However, many cases in which courts have found pre-emption pursuant
to Pilot Life involve not a claim "for benefits," but a claim for damages as a
result of negligence by a defendant that arguably occurred during the benefit
determination process. Corcoran again provides a good example. Corcoran
involved a claim against a utilization review provider for an allegedly negligent
determination that hospitalization of the mother was unnecessary.329 The Fifth
Circuit held that the cause of action was pre-empted because it was really an
action for improper processing of the Corcorans' claim for benefits, and thus
within the scope of Pilot Life's holding. Yet, the claim was essentially a
malpractice claim: i.e., that United Healthcare made an erroneous medical
decision when it denied the hospitalization recommended by Mrs. Corcoran's
325. 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987).
326. Id. at 43.
327. Id. at 48.
328. Id.
329. 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992). The defendant, United Healthcare, was the
entity which provided utilization review services for the ERISA plan. Instead of hospitalization,
United Healthcare authorized ten hours per day of home nursing care. During a period of time
when no nurse was on duty, the fetus went into distress and died.
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physician.330
United Healthcare argued that the decision was not a medical decision,
but rather, that United Healthcare was merely performing "claims handling
functions" and the decision was made in its capacity as a plan fiduciary about
what benefits were authorized under the plan.33" ' The Fifth Circuit agreed
with both parties. The court stated that United Healthcare "makes medical
decisions-indeed, United gives medical advice-but it does so in the context
of making a determination about the availability of benefits under the
plan."332 Thus, the court characterized the claim as "a tort allegedly
committed in the course of handling a benefit determination.""' The court
acknowledged that the nature of the benefit determination was different from
the type of decision that was at issue in Pilot Life, but held that the mere fact
that it was a "benefit determination" sufficed for the claim to fall within the
scope of Pilot Life's holding that "ERISA pre-empts state-law claims alleging
improper handling of benefit claims.""'
Equating the claim in Corcoran to a claim "for benefits within the scope
of Pilot Life" requires a very liberal construction of Pilot Life. The Corcorans'
claim was not based on a violation of the terms of the plan and was not to
recover benefits due, to enforce rights, or to clarify rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.335 Nor was the action based on a violation of
ERISA or intended to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress such
violations or to enforce any provisions of ERISA.336 Rather, the claim was
a wrongful death action seeking monetary damages for emotional distress and
mental anguish caused by United Healthcare's negligence. There was an
alleged violation of a tort duty of care, not of the terms of the plan or of
ERISA.
330. Notably, the Corcorans' claim was brought pursuant to Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Id. at 1327. Article 2315 provides parents
with a claim for wrongful death of their unborn children, and permits a negligence suit against
health care providers when they fail to perform in accord with the applicable standard of care.
Id. (citing Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 637-38 (La. 1981); Chivleatto v. Divinity, 379
So. 2d 784, 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979)). However, Louisiana had not yet recognized a
negligence claim against a third-party provider of utilization review services. Id. at 1327. Because
some jurisdictions have recognized such negligence claims, (see, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of
S. Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660 (1990); Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630
(1986)), the court in Corcoran assumed that, on the facts, the Corcorans might be capable of
stating a claim for malpractice.
331. Id. at 1329-30.
332. Id. at 1331.
333. Id. at 1332.
334. Id.
335. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988).
336. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
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Similarly, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City,3 37
the plaintiff was seeking damages for negligence which caused a considerable
delay in authorizing Kuhl's heart surgery. The plaintiffs employer provided
health care benefits by contracting with an HMO, Lincoln National, which was
not a provider of care, but which acted more as an administrator whose
function was to pay for medical services provided to plan participants and
beneficiaries. Lincoln National was not contractually obligated to pay for
services rendered outside of the "service area" or by non-participating
professionals unless a patient obtained precertification. Kuhl's primary care
physician and participating cardiologist concluded that heart surgery was
necessary,33 and that it should be performed outside of the service area at
Barnes Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri.339 When Barnes Hospital called for
the requisite precertification, Lincoln National refused to authorize the surgery.
Instead, Lincoln National required Kuhl to see yet another cardiologist to
determine whether the surgery could be performed in Kansas City. When this
cardiologist concurred that surgery should be performed at Barnes Hospital,
Lincoln National authorized the surgery, but a surgery team was not available
until September. By September, Kuhl's heart had deteriorated to the extent that
surgery was no longer a viable option. Kuhl died while waiting for a heart
transplant.
Three theories in Kuhl-tortious interference, medical malpractice, and
breach of contract-were based on Lincoln National's alleged misconduct in
delaying Kuhl's heart surgery. The court readily found that the plaintiffs
claims were in essence based on the contention that Lincoln National
improperly processed Kuhl's claim for benefits, and the court therefore held
that the claims were within the scope of the principle enunciated in Pilot Life:
"the decision not to precertify payment related directly to Lincoln National's
administration of benefits. "34
Yet it is difficult to characterize the claim in Kuhl as a claim for
improper processing or as a claim for benefits. Lincoln National followed the
procedures that it had designed and which were likely set forth in Kuhl's
policy, in order to ensure that medical care was provided within the service
area when possible-namely, the acquisition of a second opinion. The fact that
it obtained second opinions thus did not constitute "improper" processing.
Further, because Lincoln National authorized the surgery in St. Louis, there
was not a denial of benefits. Rather, Kuhl's claim might be better characterized
337. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Kuht].
338. Lincoln National arranged for a second opinion by another participating physician;
the second opinion confirmed that surgery was necessary. Id. at 300.
339. Barnes Hospital was deemed appropriate because the Kansas City area hospitals did
not have the proper equipment. Id.
340. Id. at 303.
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as one for failure to use reasonable care in devising the processes for
precertification, because Lincoln National failed to include procedures for
exigent circumstances. As such, the claim is grounded in Lincoln National's
conduct that very likely pertained to a number of benefit plans. That is,
Lincoln National likely had contracts with several employers in the Kansas
City area, and all policies likely had the same provisions requiring second
opinions. Thus, as in Corcoran, the court in Kuhl applied a very liberal
construction of Pilot Life's holding.
Travelers arguably supports the contention that different results in both
Corcoran and Kuhl would be appropriate. Claims such as medical malpractice,
or claims that are more accurately characterized as claims for failure to use
reasonable care in devising the processes involved in benefit administration,
are not "claims for benefits." Travelers' emphasis on the presumption against
pre-emption and the need for logical stopping points to ERISA pre-emption
suggests that courts should be more precise when characterizing claims.
Congress could not have envisioned the greater complexity involved in
providing health care coverage today, more particularly, the infusion of
multiple entities in the provision of benefits due to the formation of integrated
delivery networks. Thus, it is not at all clear that Congress intended to pre-
empt malpractice claims or negligence claims against such entities. Because
ERISA pre-emption extends to claims addressed by ERISA, imprecise
classification of such claims will lead to an overly broad application. The
Travelers framework therefore suggests that if it is not clear that a state
common law claim is really a claim for benefits or a claim within the scope
of section 502(a), then courts should not readily conclude that the claim is
within the scope of Pilot Life's holding.
3. Claims That Relate to ERISA Plans Because of Their Effect on Employer
Decisions Concerning Benefit Structure or Administration of the Plan
As noted at the beginning of this section on state contract and tort claims,
courts use various rationales to justify a finding of pre-emption: e.g., (1) the
claim is really a claim for benefits or a claim for improper processing of the
claim, (2) the claim affects plans by causing pass-through costs that will result
in the plan having to chose between higher costs or a reduction in benefits,
(3) the claim regulates the administration of the plan, (4) the claim arises from
the provision of benefits pursuant to an ERISA plan or (5) the claim requires
an examination of plan documents. Most of these rationales are relevant in
resolving the pre-emption issue where the contract or tort claim falls into the
third category of laws that the Supreme Court has indicated may be pre-
empted: state laws that have an impermissible effect on decisions concerning
benefit structure or administration of the ERISA plan. As the preceding
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sections of this article note, few state contract or tort actions can be
characterized as being designed specifically to apply to ERISA plans, and few
can accurately be characterized as providing alternative enforcement
mechanisms and therefore within the scope of Pilot Life. Thus, most claims
involve state laws that merely affect ERISA plans. This section explores
whether the framework for pre-emption after Travelers will restrain the ever-
increasing scope of pre-emption of this category of state law causes of action
by analyzing the continued validity of the above noted rationales.
a. Claims That Affect Plans by Causing Pass-through Costs
In analyzing whether ERISA pre-empts various state causes of actions,
many courts inquire whether allowing the cause of action to proceed could
result in increased costs being passed on to the ERISA plan. For example, in
Ricci v. Gooberman,34 1 the district court justified pre-emption of a
malpractice claim against an HMO by noting that permitting the vicarious
liability claim342 would require both individual providers and HMOs to carry
liability insurance for acts of the provider, "resulting in higher costs that
certainly trickle down to plan beneficiaries."343 Under even a narrow
interpretation, the Court's decision in Travelers precludes this effect on ERISA
plans from being a sufficient justification for pre-emption.
Under Travelers, if the effect of a state law only influences an employer's
decisions regarding the benefit structures or administrative practices of an
ERISA plan, then the state law is not pre-empted. A mere trickle-down of
costs in the form of higher premiums or cost-sharing by beneficiaries would
not likely rise to the level of "binding" benefit structures or administrative
practices decisions. Rather, a mere trickle-down of costs due to state contract
or tort actions are analogous to the pass-through costs of provider taxes and
hospital surcharges. A court would therefore be precluded from justifying pre-
emption on this basis alone.
However, other than the court in Ricci, few courts have grounded a pre-
emption decision solely upon a finding of trickle-down costs. For example, in
Corcoran,3" the Fifth Circuit held that the negligence claim against the
provider of utilization review services for the ERISA plan was pre-empted
because the claim was really a claim for improper processing of the claim and
thus within the scope of Pilot Life's holding.345 In addition, however, the
341. 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993) [hereinafter Ricci].
342. Under the theory of vicarious liability, a principle may be held liable for the
negligence of an agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429.
343. Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 318.
344. Corcoran, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
345. See supra notes 291-94, 323-34 and accompanying text.
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court stated that Congress intended that such a claim would be pre-empted
because the cost of imposing a negligence duty upon entities providing
utilization review for ERISA plans would increase the costs of utilization
review services, thereby increasing the cost to health benefit plans "and
ultimately decreasing the pool of plan funds available to reimburse
participants. 36 The infusion of other rationales for pre-emption of state law
claims renders it difficult to definitely conclude that the Travelers decision will
restrain findings of pre-emption in cases involving state law contract and tort
claims. But without doubt, the decision undermines the ability of courts to use
the "trickle-down" effect as a rationale for pre-emption.
b. Claims That Regulate the Administration of the Plan
This article has developed the argument that many claims that courts
characterize as being within the scope of Pilot Life are not really claims "for
benefits" or claims for "improper processing of claims," and thus should not
be pre-empted on that basis alone. However, those claims may be based on
allegedly wrongful conduct by plan administrators or providers of health care
during the process of a participant's use of benefits, and courts may therefore
find another basis for pre-emption. Courts often characterize such claims
broadly as involving the "administration of the plan." Drawing upon the
Supreme Court's statements that Congress intended to preclude "administrative
inefficiencies," lower courts then readily find pre-emption. A similar
counterargument can be made as to this rationale: many claims that courts have
labeled as involving the "administration of the plan" simply have no effect on
the administrative practices relevant to the question of ERISA pre-emption.
Travelers readily supports a finding of pre-emption if the effect of a state
law on administrative practices actually or practically binds choices regarding
administrative practices or precludes the use of certain administrative practices.
Thus, whether state law contract or tort claims that affect ERISA plans should
be pre-empted depends on two central issues: (1) whether the effect of the state
claim is upon a practice that constitutes "administration of the plan" within
the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption provisions, and, if so, (2) whether the
effect meets the standard of Travelers, i.e., does it bind decisions regarding
the design of the administration of the plan.
Whether a state law contract or tort claim could ever meet the Travelers
346. 965 F.2d at 1333. See also Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc.,
848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
several reasons for pre-emption of an ostensible agency negligence claim against an HMO: the
allegations focus on the representations made by the plan administrator to the plaintiffs; the claim
is based on the circumstances of medical treatment; and higher costs will invariably be passed
along to health care consumers).
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standard is questionable. For example, Kuhl involved a claim for failure to use
reasonable care in devising the processes used for precertification.347 To
assess the effect of a state law negligence claim, a court would need to assume
that the claim was not pre-empted and consider the effect of a decision in favor
of the plaintiff on ERISA plans. A finding in favor of the plaintiff would send
the signal that a tort duty exists and that reasonable care must be used in
designing the process used for precertification. However, the specificity of the
signal would be limited. For example, the case might be construed as meaning
that reasonable precertification procedures must include some means of
determining whether the situation is urgent and of modifying the process to
expedite authorization of medical care when necessary. It could, of course,
be argued that even this limited holding would preclude the use of a particular
practice (e.g., second opinions) in all situations. However, a more reasonable
interpretation is that the effect would not "bind" choices in designing the
administrative process because the employer is still free to chose the means
for determining urgency and what the modified procedures will be. Travelers
held that, in the absence of clear congressional intent, pre-emption of state
laws within the traditional police power is inappropriate. Thus, where it is
questionable whether the effect of the state law meets the standard set forth
in Travelers, the presumption against pre-emption should control the outcome.
Analysis of the second issue-whether the effect of the state claim is upon
a practice that constitutes "administration of the plan" within the meaning of
ERISA's pre-emption provisions-similarly leads to the conclusion that the
Travelers framework can result in fewer state law claims being subjected to
an overbroad application of the pre-emption doctrine. The issue should not be
merely whether the claim somehow "involves" the administration of the plan.
Rather, the issue is whether allowing the plaintiff to pursue the claim will have
a binding effect on those administrative practices that the Supreme Court has
indicated are central to the underlying purpose of ERISA pre-emption.
As this article has explained, the Supreme Court has indicated that
Congress was largely concerned with administrative inefficiencies experienced
by the employer.348 Thus, the scope of the phrase "administration of the
plan" could arguably be limited to the "employer's administrative scheme" or
those procedures or practices that an employer must perform in order to
provide health care coverage. Further, the Supreme Court has generally
focused on the on-going processes and practices developed to effectuate the
provision of benefits to plan participants or beneficiaries, i.e., benefit-based
practices akin to the claims administration functions that an insurer traditionally
347. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 303 (the court held that the claims were within the scope of the
principle enunciated in Pilot Life: "the decision not to precertify payment relates directly to
Lincoln National's administration of benefits.").
348. See supra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
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performs for an insured plan. If this interpretation is adopted, the question is
whether the state law claim at issue affects the employer's administrative
scheme for the provision of health care benefits.
Notably, the extent of the employer's administrative scheme will vary
from case to case. This article has acknowledged that an employer which elects
to provide benefits through a multi-employer ERISA plan that owns and
operates the medical centers that provide care exclusively to plan participants
and beneficiaries has undertaken a host of obligations including the monitoring
of assets in the multi-employer fund. 349 In other situations, however, an
employer may simply contract with an insurer, an HMO or other MCO, and
it is that entity which accepts the financial risk involved in providing heath care
to the employees. In such a case, the employer's administrative scheme may
be fairly limited. The employer must make numerous decisions related to the
level of benefits, eligible employees, whether to provide the coverage through
a traditional insurer versus an HMO or MCO. The employer may also devise
a program to educate employees about options that may be available or how
to submit claims, etc.35
However, the key administrative practice for the employer who contracts
with an insurer or HMO or MCO for health care coverage is often simply
writing a check. 5' The employer is often only responsible for remitting
premiums to the insurer or subscription fees to the HMO or MCO, in whole
or in part. This may involve determining eligible employees and calculating
benefit levels. However, it is then generally the insurer, HMO or MCO that
must develop the sophisticated, ongoing administrative program to meet its
contractual responsibility of providing health care coverage to the insured or
enrollees .352
In Fort Halifax, the Court noted that simply writing a check hardly
constitutes the operation of a benefit plan..353 The employer which elects to
349. See supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
350. Cf. International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 298 (6th
Cir. 1991) (the employer purchased group medical insurance from a multi-employer trust which
served as the administrator; the plan was underwritten by an insurer; in its arrangement with the
administrator, the employer's obligations were minimal-the employer selected the terms and the
price for its employees' coverage and the employer paid the premium).
351. Id.
352. In contrast, when employers undertake to provide a pension for employees, the
employer generally accepts the full financial risk involved. The employer cannot merely contract
with an entity to assume the risk for providing pension benefits. The employer is more likely to
be required to oversee more complex administrative schemes and to undertake, in addition to
obligations such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels and making
disbursements, activities such as monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments and
keeping appropriate records in order to comply with applicable reporting requirements. The
complexity resulting from the distinct financial obligations involved with a pension plan is likely
to be reflected in a more complex administrative scheme for the employer.
353. Fort Halifax, 982 U.S. at 12 (1987).
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use an insured plan has an interest in keeping claims to a minimum to avoid
future increases in premiums or fees, but the complex activities related to
claims management are administrative practices of the insurer, HMO or MCO
which is underwriting the risk of providing health care coverage. The employer
does not necessarily face demands that create a need for complex financial
coordination and control. To achieve a pragmatic assessment of congressional
intent to pre-empt, courts should keep this distinction in mind and scrutinize
whether the law at issue mandates an administrative practice that is in fact
within the employer's administrative scheme.
Alternatively, the scope of the phrase "administration of the plan" could
be viewed as extending to the administrative scheme of an insurer, third-party
administrator, or HMO or other MCO, if appropriately limited. Because the
Court has indicated that Congress was concerned with the on-going processes
and practices developed to effectuate an employer's provision of benefits to
plan participants or beneficiaries,354 a logical point of delimitation would be
to encompass only those functions provided directly for or specifically
pertaining to a particular employer and that employer's plan assets. This might
include functions such as determining eligibility of employees, providing
information about the plan, processing claims including performing
precertification procedures, and managing the assets of the employer.
However, as noted previously, even if an employer contracts with a third-party
administrator, many functions of that entity may not be properly characterized
as administration of the employer's plan. Rather, that entity must engage in
its own administration of its business. The administration of the entity's
business will depend on the scope of its particular operations. If a third-party
administrator that the employer contracts with is also a part of an integrated
delivery network and provides management services for the network, then
courts must distinguish between those practices which pertain specifically to
the claims management function the entity is performing for an employer and
those functions it is performing for the network. If the alternative interpretation
of the scope of the phrase "administration of the plan" is adopted, the inquiry
becomes whether the practice effected-even if performed by an insurer, third-
party administrator, or HMO or other MCO-is one of the on-going processes
and practices developed to effectuate an employer's provision of benefits to
plan participants or beneficiaries,3"' or whether the practice is more properly
characterized as one for the administration of the business of the third-party
administrator, or HMO or other MCO.
354. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
355. That is, a practice performed specifically pertaining to a particular employer and that
employer's plan assets such as determining eligibility of employees, providing information about
the plan, processing claims including performing precertification procedures, and managing the
assets of the employer.
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Because the Supreme Court has suggested that the scope of pre-emption
is related to the host of obligations which an employer undertakes when
establishing and maintaining a benefit plan, a proper pragmatic pre-emption
analysis should include scrutiny of the structure of the particular benefit plan
in order to assure that pre-emption is appropriately limited. This should result
in a narrowing of the scope of "administration of the plan" in line with
Travelers' signal to restrain the scope of ERISA pre-emption. An analysis of
two cases demonstrates why this conclusion is sound.
In Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO,356 the plaintiffs decedent husband
Glen Nealy died as a result of myocardial infarction after encountering
significant delays in access to his cardiologist. Nealy had been enrolled in an
ERISA health care plan provided by his employer through defendant U.S.
Healthcare Versatile Plus HMO (U.S. Healthcare).357 U.S. Healthcare
allegedly represented that Nealy would be entitled to uninterrupted medical
care for his pre-existing anginal condition, including treatment by the
physicians Nealy had previously seen.358 However, Nealy had difficulty
seeing a participating primary care physician because U.S. Healthcare failed
to furnish Nealy with proper identification. When the primary care physician
finally saw Nealy the physician was unaware of U.S. Healthcare's procedures
for referring to a non-participating physician, and Nealy was unable to fill
prescriptions because U.S. Healthcare provided incorrect and invalid
information to the pharmaceutical provider. Although Nealy first sought care
on or about April 2, 1992, Nealy did not receive a referral to visit a
participating cardiologist until May 15, 1992."' 9 The appointment was set
for May 19, 1992; however, the decedent suffered cardiac arrest on May 18,
1992.360
The plaintiff's complaint included claims for breach of contract,
misrepresentation, professional misconduct, medical malpractice, wrongful
death, loss of services, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach
of fiduciary duty.3 6 1 Interestingly, in resolving the pre-emption question, the
court relied upon a Second Circuit opinion which used language very close to
the Supreme Court's language in Travelers: namely, that "three types of laws
were generally found preempted: (1) those that 'provide an alternative cause
of action to employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA;' (2) those that
refer specifically to ERISA plans and apply solely to them; and (3) those that
'interfere with the calculation of benefits owed to an employee.' . . . [or have]
356. 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) [hereinafter Nealy].
357. Id. at 968.
358. Id. at 969.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 968.
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an effect on the administration of the plan .... "362 Nonetheless, the court's
conclusions were based on rationales much more liberal than the quoted
language supports.
The court's analysis was sound from the perspective of identifying the
category of law that each claim fell within. For example, the court first
examined the claims against U.S. Healthcare and its vice president and
director, and seemed to identify them as laws which had an effect on the
administration of the plan. However, the court's logic broke down when the
court broadly concluded that:
In ruling on Plaintiffs claims it will be necessary to determine the
benefits that the ERISA plan was to provide to Glenn Nealy. Thus
the very existence and core of the plan would have to be
scrutinized. In effect, it will require the trier of fact not only to
determine the specific benefits, but how these benefits were
administered by U.S. Healthcare. This is exactly the situation that
Congress wanted to avoid by enacting ERISA and providing for
broad pre-emption. U.S. Healthcare and [its director], as the plan
providers, are controlled by ERISA and any remedy that Plaintiff
is entitled to must derive from the Act itself.363
Thus, although the language the court relied upon correctly suggests that the
inquiry turns upon an assessment of the "effect" of the law on the
"administration of the plan," the court found it sufficient that resolving the
claims would require a court to look at plan documents and assess the
administration process. Yet, merely looking at plan documents to determine
whether the defendants engaged in misleading or negligent conduct will not
have any effect on the actual administration of the plan.3" Indeed, even if
the suit proceeded and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff, the effect on
the plan administration would be de minimis and likely not sufficient to meet
the standard articulated in Travelers. U.S. Healthcare would simply understand
that it must provide timely and accurate information to subscribers and
providers. It is not at all clear that this is "exactly the situation that Congress
wanted to avoid by enacting ERISA."
Moreover, it is not clear that all of the actions by the HMO in Nealy
should have been considered "administration of the plan" within the meaning
362. Id. at 972 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989)).
363. Id. at 972.
364. See Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995) (mere
reference to plan documents to resolve the issue of agency in a vicarious liability claim does not
implicate the concerns of ERISA pre-emption).
Copyright 0 1996 by the Yale Journal on Regulation
The Yale Journal on Regulation
of ERISA. U.S. Healthcare failed to furnish Nealy with proper identification,
failed to educate its participating primary care physicians about U.S.
Healthcare's procedures for referring to a non-participating physician, failed
to provide correct and valid information to its participating pharmaceutical
provider, and failed to effectuate Nealy's referral in a timely manner.365 To
resolve whether laws that affect actions by HMOs or other MCOs which
contract with an employer to provide care to employees may be pre-empted,
courts must consider the appropriate scope of the phrase "administration of
the plan" or "administrative practices" for purposes of ERISA pre-emption.
Therefore, the two questions the court should have asked are (1) whether
the state law claims at issue affect the employer's administrative scheme for
the provision of health care benefits; and (2) whether the practices
affected-even if performed by an insurer, third-party administrator, or HMO
or other MCO-are practices performed specifically pertaining to a particular
employer and that employer's plan assets, such as determining eligibility of
employees, providing information about the plan, processing claims including
performing precertification procedures, and managing the assets of the
employer.
For example, the claims in Nealy would arguably have had some effect
on the procedures used to get proper identification to plan enrollees, the
processes used to educate participating primary care physicians about U.S.
Healthcare's procedures for referring to a non-participating physician, its
practices relating to providing correct and valid information to its participating
pharmacies, and the processes used to effectuate referrals in a timely manner.
Providing identification to enrollees could fall within the employer's
administrative scheme, and effectuating referrals could arguably be viewed as
a function related to the administration of a particular employer's plan. Yet,
educating and providing accurate information to providers and pharmacies
could arguably be viewed as functions related to the administration of the
health care network. More details are necessary before the key questions can
be answered. The important point is, however, that the distinction should be
made. Otherwise, the scope of the phrase "administration of the plan" and thus
of ERISA pre-emption becomes unjustifiably broad.
The district court opinion in Dukes v. United States Health Care System
of Pennsylvania, Inc. 366 provides another good example of the overreaching
pre-emptive effect of ERISA when the scope of the phrase "administration of
the plan" is not properly limited. In Dukes, the plaintiff's decedent belonged
to an employee group health plan administered by the HMO. The decedent had
365. See Nealy, 844 F. Supp. at 969.
366. 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) [hereinafter Dukes], rev'd on other grounds, 57
F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that action was not removable because tort claims were not
within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)).
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received allegedly negligent medical care from two physicians who were
associated with a hospital and a mental health center. However, one claim was
against the HMO for its own negligence. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
the HMO failed to use reasonable care in selecting, retaining, screening,
monitoring, and evaluating the other defendants-i.e., the participating
providers.367 The court found the claim pre-empted.36 The court recognized
that the direct negligence claim against the HMO would require an examination
of the procedures the HMO used to select the doctors and hospitals with which
it affiliates.369 Yet, the court then held that, because the HMO served as
administrator of the employee group health plan, the claims therefore involved
"administration of the plan" and thus "related to" the plan.370
However, if the court had scrutinized whether the state action would
affect a practice that is more properly classified as a function of the
administration of the HMO's own business, the result would have been
different. In the emerging integrated delivery systems, some entity must
perform the function of deciding which physicians, hospitals, and other health
professionals or institutions will comprise the network, as well as which
physicians will serve as primary care gatekeepers. This function is clearly
attenuated from functions such as claims administration and therefore should
be viewed as constituting a part of that entity's business-i.e., the
administration of its business. Even if performed by the entity which also
provides administration of plans for employers, the selection of network
physicians should not be characterized as administration of an ERISA plan.371
Adopting the pragmatic approach suggested by Travelers will require
courts to scrutinize claims on a case-by-case basis because of the many
organizational options available for ERISA plans. For example, one situation
367. Id. at 40.
368. Although not central to its decision, the court in Dukes also equated malpractice
claims generally with an assertion that the medical services did not measure to the benefit plan's
promised quality. Casting the claim in a contractual light does render it more susceptible to ERISA
pre-emption under Pilot Life because the claim becomes a functional equivalent of a claim for
benefits. See 481 U.S. 41. See also Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, 956 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.
1992) (ERISA pre-empts any attempt to use state law to obtain plan benefits). However, plaintiffs
have the right to choose their theories. Claims arising from medical treatment may be cast as
negligence claims or breach of contract or warranty, depending on the facts and circumstances.
If the facts support a tort claim, it is not appropriate for the court to recharacterize claims in this
manner for the purpose of finding pre-emption. See generally Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing
Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1986).
369. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42 n.4.
370. Id.
371. An exception may exist if a MCO actually selects a distinct provider network for each
employer or sponsor. In that case, the function of selecting providers could be characterized as
'administration of an ERISA plan." However, it is unlikely that this an economically sound
method of operating a MCO. See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the Financial Flows
in American Health Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS 172 (Supp. 1993).
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where "administration of the plan" could encompass the process of selecting
network physicians would be where an employer takes a more central role in
the formation of the provider network that serves the employees and thus in
selecting providers that will comprise the network.372 However, the court's
statement in Dukes that, because the HMO in the case served as administrator
of the employee group health plan, the direct negligence claim involved
"administration of the plan" and was thus "related to" the plan,373 was
clearly overbroad. The employer in Dukes merely contracted for health
coverage, and the HMO administered the plan. The tort action against the
HMO for negligent credentialing arose from the HMO's administration of its
own business.
In sum, the framework for ERISA pre-emption after Travelers could lead
to a narrowing of the scope of ERISA pre-emption based on a finding that a
state cause of action involves the administration of the plan. The Court in
Travelers clarified that Congress intended to pre-empt state laws whose effect
actually or practically binds employer choices as to administrative practices.
However, in light of Travelers emphasis on deference to traditional state
common law actions and the need for logical points of delimitation for ERISA
pre-emption, courts should engage in closer scrutiny of state contract and tort
claims that arguably relate to ERISA plans. To identify the logical point of
demarcation for the scope of "administration of the plan," courts should
carefully assess whether the practice that the state claim might affect is in fact
a function that constitutes a part of the administrative scheme carried out by
the employer (or is at least related to a particular employer's plan), or whether
it is a function that is better characterized as administration of the business of
a plan administrator. Additionally, even in cases where a court determines that
the practice that is affected is appropriately classified as "administration of the
plan," the court must recognize that a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a state
contract or tort claim will generally have limited impact and that it is therefore
difficult to ever conclude that the effect of the claim actually or practically
binds choices regarding administrative practices.
c. Claims Arising From the Circumstances of Medical Treatment under an
ERISA Plan
The last rationale that lower courts have used to justify pre-emption that
this article will consider is that the state claim, generally a malpractice claim
against a provider, arises from the circumstances involving medical treatment.
372. E.g., a self-insured plan such as in the Axelrod case where the ERISA plan owns and
operates the centers that provide medical care and therefore would have a more affirmative role
in building the network. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
373. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42 n.4.
Vol. 13:255, 1996
Travelers Insurance and ERISA
For example, the Dukes court, relying on several other lower court
decisions,374 also held that a malpractice claim against the provider and a
vicarious negligence claim against the HMO were pre-empted because the
claims were based on the "circumstances of medical treatment" provided
pursuant to the plan.375 For the same reason, the court in Nealy held that
malpractice claims against the providers of care were pre-empted."' This
justification simply has no support in Supreme Court precedent, and the pre-
emption analysis after Travelers should therefore result in more restrained pre-
emption analyses.
While a cause of action arising from an injury incurred in the course of
receiving medical treatment covered by an ERISA plan relates to the plan in
some sense, a malpractice claim does not fall within any of the categories of
laws that may be pre-empted. Malpractice actions, whether against the
providers of care or against an HMO or other MCO on a direct or vicarious
liability theory, are not designed to affect ERISA plans and do not impose a
duty upon ERISA plans by referencing ERISA plans. Rather, malpractice
actions are grounded in the social policy of requiring certain entities within
our health care system to meet desired standards of care.377 They are directed
at entities that operate within our health care system. The elements of a cause
of action grounded in vicarious or direct negligence can be stated without
references to ERISA plans.378 Further, malpractice actions are clearly not
within the scope of section 502(a) and thus cannot be characterized as an
alternative enforcement mechanism. Lastly, the claim cannot legitimately be
characterized as affecting an administrative practice within the employer's
administrative scheme, nor a practice that is within a broader scope of the
phrase "administration of the plan." Malpractice claims arising because of the
circumstances of medical treatment will affect only the practices relevant to
health care provision. Those practices cannot reasonably be deemed within the
scope of the administrative practices that Congress intended ERISA to
protect.379
Moreover, any potential conflicting standards regarding the standard of
care would not fall within the scope of Congress's core concern about
374. See, e.g., Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993); Altieri v. CIGNA
Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990).
375. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 43.
376. Nealy, 844 F. Supp. 972.
377. ANNAS Er AL., supra note 108, at 444-70.
378. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429.
379. Cf. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that,
just as ERISA does not pre-empt a malpractice claim against the doctor, it should not pre-empt
a vicarious liability claim against an HMO, yet also suggesting that a claim against the HMO based
on negligent administration may be within the scope of ERISA pre-emption).
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uniformity.3"' Congress intended for ERISA to protect employers and plan
sponsors, such as unions, from non-uniform regulation that would complicate
administration of nationwide plans or preclude uniform benefit structures. 38 ,
Where the employer or sponsor contracts with an entity, such as an
administrator, which then contracts with an HMO or an integrated provider
network, imposing tort liability on providers within the delivery network may
result in some increased costs, but will not bind administrative decisions.
Similarly, imposition of liability on the HMO or MCO for some negligent act
in administering the plan may send a signal to use greater care in that aspect
of administering the plan but will not bind administrative decisions. Even
where an employer or sponsor elects to provide health benefits in a more direct
manner, such as by owning facilities and hiring health care providers,
malpractice liability would have little more than an influential economic impact
on the plan. And if the effect is more than economic, employers and
administrators of ERISA plans retain control over what modifications should
be made to avoid future tort liability.
Even without the recent guidance from the Court in Travelers, several
courts have found that ERISA does not pre-empt state law malpractice claims
against providers or vicarious liability claim against HMOs. In the case of first
impression at the Federal appellate level, the Tenth Circuit determined that a
vicarious liability claim against an HMO was not pre-empted. In Pacificare
of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, s2 the Tenth Circuit rejected the reasoning that a
vicarious malpractice claim should be pre-empted because it concerns the
delivery of benefits under the plan.38 3 Rather, the court in Pacificare
followed those courts which took the approach first articulated in Independence
HMO, Inc. v. Smith.3" In that case, the court similarly addressed ERISA
pre-emption of a state cause of action based on vicarious liability. The court
asked the right question: "Does this sort of state tort action 'impact upon' an
employee benefit plan or 'affect the congressional scheme' contained in
[ERISA] . . . ?"3'5 The court found that the action had nothing to do with
any denial of rights under the plan, but, rather, that the plaintiff was seeking
redress for physical injuries in which the HMO's selection of an operating
physician allegedly played a part. In the court's opinion, this did not affect the
plan, especially since pursuit of the tort did not depend upon the contractual
380. Again, an exception may exist where the employer undertakes to provide care and
select the network physicians.
381. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
382. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
383. Id. at 154-55 (also rejecting the rationale that pre-emption could be justified because
the claim requires examination of the plan to determine obligations owed under the plan and the
relationship between the plan and plan doctors).
384. 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) [hereinafter Independence].
385. Id. at 988.
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entitlement to health plan benefits.386 Many other courts adopted the rationale
articulated in Independence.3"7
More recently, the court in Smith v. HMO Great Lakes38 followed this
line of reasoning in holding that ERISA did not pre-empt a medical malpractice
claim against the HMO arising from certain cost containment procedures. The
court noted that the plaintiffs negligence claims were not based on the
"insurance plan" between the plaintiff and the HMO, but on the contractual
relationships between the HMO and the providers who treated the plaintiff's
child. Thus, the claims "have nothing to do with any denial of plaintiff's rights
under the plan." 9" The court specifically noted that the outcome of the
lawsuit would not affect the plan.39 The pre-emption analysis after Travelers
readily suggests that the outcomes reached by these courts is more
appropriate.391 Travelers should therefore go a long way toward restraining
and rationalizing pre-emption outcomes involving malpractice claims against
health care providers as well as claims against HMOs or other MCOs.
Conclusion
The Court in Travelers specifically addressed only the pre-emption of
state hospital rate-setting legislation as applied to insured ERISA plans.
However, the opinion can be construed as a strong signal that the scope of
ERISA pre-emption generally should be more restrained than many courts are
concluding. Furthermore, the analytical framework for resolving ERISA pre-
emption issues that can be derived from Travelers can effectively restrain
findings of pre-emption if appropriate arguments are presented to courts.
The framework for analysis after Travelers leads to the conclusion that
emerging state uses of provider taxes and comparable surcharges that are not
imposed directly on ERISA plans are not pre-empted, whether or not the plans
are insured or self-insured. Although not as clear, use of the Travelers
386. Id.
387. See Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d at 153 n.2 (collecting cases).
388. 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
389. Id. at 672 (citing Independence, 733 F. Supp. 983).
390. Id.
391. Notably, some lower have courts also relied on Painters of Phila. Dist. Council No.
21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1989) as support for a finding of
no pre-emption. However, that case addressed the issue in the context of deciding whether ERISA
provides an implied cause of action against an auditor for breach of a statutory duty of care. One
element in the test for finding an implied right of action is whether the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 1151. Thus, although the court stated that "Congress
did not intend to preempt a whole panoply of state law" in the area of professional malpractice,
Id. at 1153 n.7, the court was not conducting an ERISA pre-emption analysis and did not consider
the degree of indirect impact on ERISA plans that could be caused by state medical negligence
actions.
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framework should restrain the increasingly common findings of pre-emption
of state contract and tort claims that have some effect on ERISA plans.
Arguments such as those developed in this article that support a finding of no
pre-emption of state contract and tort claims should be accorded greater weight
in light of Travelers for two primary reasons. First and foremost, the Court
in Travelers reinvigorated the presumption against pre-emption of laws
historically within the domain of state police powers. Second, the Court
expressly validated the importance of a pragmatic approach in assessing
congressional intent and of assuring that logical points of delimitation are
developed by the judiciary. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the
Travelers framework can go a long way toward rationalizing and delimiting
ERISA pre-emption.
